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Removing the Malice from Federal “Malicious
Prosecution”: What Cognitive Science Can
Teach Lawyers About Reform
Sofia Yakren*
Section 1983 (“§ 1983”), Title 42 of the U.S. Code empowers individuals
suffering civil rights abuses at the hands of state actors to seek recourse in
federal court.  The statute was enacted in response to southern states’ failure to
control the Ku Klux Klan.  Since 1961, it has increasingly become a vehicle for
federal reform of unconstitutional state and local government practices.  Nation-
wide, state criminal justice systems cry out for such ex post reform, as they
continue to generate wrongful convictions at unacceptable rates with no notable
preventative measures in place.
“Malicious prosecution” claims brought under § 1983 are a common
mechanism for redressing state-driven wrongful convictions, but this Article as-
serts that they are not meeting their full reform potential.  A plurality of federal
courts erroneously requires plaintiffs to prove malice in support of such claims.
While superficially the requirement comports with the “malicious” prosecution
nomenclature, the nomenclature itself is misleading.  Federal malicious prose-
cution claims are based on the Fourth Amendment, the purpose of which is to
hold state defendants accountable for objectively unreasonable acts — not in-
tentional, or malicious, ones.
In abandoning the Fourth Amendment’s purpose, the offending courts have
also ignored the real causes of wrongful convictions, and therefore have failed
to further true reform.  Research shows that the vast majority of wrongful con-
victions are driven not by malice but by cognitive biases — mental processes
that filter information subjectively, causing inaccurate perceptions and objec-
tively unreasonable decisionmaking.  Although unintentional and often uncon-
scious, cognitive biases may be ameliorated through education, exposure to
divergent views, and reform of systemic factors that trigger and exacerbate bias.
Reframing § 1983 relief for wrongful conviction as a question of objective un-
reasonableness rather than malice would tie liability more closely to: (1) non-
malicious cognitive errors that frequently taint state actors’ decisions during
criminal proceedings; and (2) states’ failure to implement cognitive error-neu-
tralizing practices.  This change to the legal standard, accompanied by close
consideration of cognitive science, has the potential to enhance plaintiffs’ access
to compensation and to require state reform of the true systemic causes of many
wrongful convictions.
* Associate Professor of Law, CUNY School of Law.  I am grateful to David Wong for
inspiring this Article and teaching me invaluable lessons about effective lawyering, as well as
to Mr. Wong’s tireless advocates, including William Goodman, Jaykumar Menon, and Jonathan
C. Moore.  I thank Ann Shalleck of American University Washington College of Law for her
early feedback and support of these ideas, and CUNY School of Law Library faculty Raquel J.
Gabriel, Yasmin Sokkar Harker, and Jonathan Saxon for brilliant research support.  Thank you
also to the faculties of CUNY Law and Albany Law School for challenging comments on
drafts.  Finally, my sincere gratitude to the talented editors of the Harvard Civil Rights–Civil
Liberties Law Review, particularly Zoe¨ Brennan-Krohn, for ever so graciously providing in-
sightful substantive suggestions and refining the details.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1980, when David Wong was just seventeen years old, he left behind
his native China and settled unlawfully in the United States, where his
mother hoped he could obtain an education.1  Half a year into his new life in
New York City, he was arrested for robbery and later convicted and incar-
cerated.2  Wong publicly acknowledged his involvement in the robbery.3  It
was a subsequent wrongful conviction for the murder of a fellow inmate that
would most dramatically alter Wong’s life.
On March 12, 1986, while Wong was serving his sentence for robbery
at the Clinton Correctional Facility in Dannemora, New York, another in-
mate was stabbed to death in the prison yard.4  Correction Officer Richard F.
LaPierre, who was located in a tower 400 feet from the incident as 700
similarly clad inmates circulated in the yard, identified Wong as the perpe-
trator.5  The prison security leadership and state investigators fell in step,
despite the implausibility of LaPierre’s account and substantial exculpatory
evidence.  As a result, Wong was tried, convicted of murder, and ultimately
sentenced to a term of twenty-five years to life in prison.6
Seventeen years and several appeals later, the New York State appellate
court vacated Wong’s conviction, based on, inter alia, the lack of credibility
and consistency in LaPierre’s account, the absence of physical evidence and
motive, and uniform inmate testimony of Wong’s innocence.7  Shortly there-
after, the district attorney filed a motion, which the trial court granted, to
dismiss the murder charges against Wong.8  By that point, the wrongful con-
viction had kept Wong behind bars over a decade longer than he would have
been incarcerated for the robbery alone.9
What cognitive science tells us about why such wrongful convictions
occur — and how a logical reform to the prevailing § 1983 “malicious pros-
ecution” standard could better address these causes and potentially help de-
ter wrongful convictions — is the subject of this Article.  As one of the
litigators who pursued § 1983 relief on Wong’s behalf, I am intimately famil-
1 Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motion, Ex. 7 at 3–4, Wong v.
LaPierre, No. 8:07-CV-1110 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2011) (forensic psychological evaluation of
Dr. Sanford L. Drob).
2 Id. at 5.
3 I-Ching Ng, Freedom Elusive for Victim of Injustice, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 31,
2004, at 9, available at http://www.scmp.com/article/483796/freedom-elusive-victim-injustice,
archived at http://perma.cc/NNY6-2K6N.
4 See Wong, No. 8:07-CV-1110, slip op. at 2–3 (order granting defendants’ motion for
summary judgment).
5 See id. at 3–5.
6 See id. at 15–16.
7 Id. at 16, 18–19.
8 Id. at 19.
9 Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motion at 9, Wong,
No. 8:07-CV-1110 [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Opposition].
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iar with his story and therefore use it to illustrate the promise of my pro-
posed revision.10
Wrongful convictions like Wong’s are prevalent — a sad truth made
apparent in the last two decades.11  Due to the advent of postconviction DNA
testing, over 170 wrongfully convicted individuals have been exonerated
since 1990.12  “[H]undreds of additional exonerations . . . have been based
on evidence other than DNA.”13  DNA exonerations may attract media atten-
tion, but the majority of wrongful convictions, like Wong’s, lack biological
evidence necessary for DNA testing.14  Accordingly, these cases are “notori-
ously difficult to litigate,”15 and “known exonerations almost surely reflect
only the tip of a very large iceberg.”16
The rush of exonerations has invited scholarship on the causes of
wrongful convictions and potential reforms.17  Such inquiries have revealed
that errors in criminal investigations and prosecutions are commonly driven
by flawed eyewitness identifications, false confessions, unreliable jailhouse
informant testimony, police and prosecutorial misconduct, forensic scientific
error or fraud, and inadequate defense counsel.18  Professors Keith Findley
and Michael Scott have argued that “[a] theme running through almost
every case, that touches each of these individual causes, is the problem of
tunnel vision.”19
10 Although I represented Wong in his § 1983 action, I limit the information revealed in
this Article to what is in the public record.
11 See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 291–92 (2006); Daniel S. Medwed, Anatomy of a
Wrongful Conviction: Theoretical Implications and Practical Solutions, 51 VILL. L. REV. 337,
337–38 & n.6 (2006).
12 Findley & Scott, supra note 11, at 291. R
13 Id.
14 Medwed, supra note 11, at 356; see also Protecting the Innocent: Proposals to Reform R
the Death Penalty: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 917 (2002)
(statement of Barry Scheck) (“The vast majority (probably 80%) of felony cases do not in-
volve biological evidence that can be subjected to DNA testing.”); Nina Martin, Innocence
Lost, S.F. MAG., Nov. 2004, at 78, 105, available at http://deathpenalty.org/downloads/SFMag
.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/R29J-QCLM (noting that “only about 10 percent of criminal
cases have any biological evidence — blood, semen, skin — to test”).
15 Medwed, supra note 11, at 356–57; accord, Hugo Adam Bedau et al., Convicting the R
Innocent in Capital Cases: Criteria, Evidence, and Inference, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 587, 602
(2004) (“Even when DNA evidence is at hand, however, it does not always lead in a steady
path to the vindication of an innocent defendant.  The evidence still has to be handled properly,
and the testing has to be done by independent and appropriately trained scientists.”); see also
Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly Discov-
ered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 656–61 (2005) (analyzing
procedural obstacles involved in litigating postconviction non-DNA claims of innocence).
16 Findley & Scott, supra note 11, at 291. R
17 Id. at 292.
18 Id.; see also BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION
AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 246 (2000).
19 Findley & Scott, supra note 11, at 292. R
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Tunnel vision refers to a “compendium of common heuristics and logi-
cal fallacies”20 stemming from various “cognitive biases,”21 including con-
firmation bias and hindsight bias.22  These biases pervade criminal
proceedings throughout, from case investigation to prosecution (plea-bar-
gaining or trial), appeal, and postconviction phases.23  Tunnel vision drives
wrongful convictions by inducing investigators, prosecutors, judges, and de-
fense lawyers to “focus on a suspect, select and filter the evidence that will
‘build a case’ for conviction, while ignoring or suppressing evidence that
points away from guilt.”24
For the purposes of this Article, most significant is that tunnel vision is
thought to be an unintentional product of the human condition, rather than
an affliction of the malicious state of mind.25  This fact becomes critical in
the context of civil relief for individuals whose convictions, like Wong’s,
have been vacated.  Once Wong was finally released from prison, civil dam-
ages were his main recourse against the prison guards and state investigator
who for years had perpetuated error upon error in investigating, prosecuting,
and convicting Wong.  Wong’s central claim of “malicious prosecution,” a
common mechanism for securing postconviction federal relief, encompassed
the crux of his injury — his unlawful seizure by the government from ar-
raignment through the postconviction dismissal of charges.  Such civil relief
would hinge not on whether the state defendants acted erroneously (though
unintentionally), but on whether they acted maliciously in pursuing Wong
criminally.
Perpetuating a legal standard that is constitutionally and cognitively
faulty, and which arguably hinders civil rights reform, the Second, Third,
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that malice is a necessary
element of a § 1983 “malicious prosecution” claim.26  Both the “malice”
element, and the nomenclature of “malicious prosecution” that makes the
element superficially logical, are misguided.  Federal “malicious prosecu-
tion” claims are grounded in the Fourth Amendment, which demands an
analysis of “objective reasonableness” rather than subjective intent.27  Rec-
ognizing this, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have excluded malice from the
20 Diane L. Martin, Lessons About Justice from the “Laboratory” of Wrongful Convic-
tions: Tunnel Vision, the Construction of Guilt and Informer Evidence, 70 UMKC L. REV. 847,
848 (2002).
21 Findley & Scott, supra note 11, at 308–09.  This Article uses the terms “cognitive bias” R
and “cognitive distortion” interchangeably.
22 These cognitive biases are defined infra Part III.
23 Id. at 295; see also Martin, supra note 20, at 850 (describing tunnel vision during the R
police investigation stage).
24 Martin, supra note 20, at 848. R
25 Findley & Scott, supra note 11, at 292. R
26 See infra note 68 and accompanying text.  Wong filed his § 1983 action in the Northern R
District of New York, which sits in the Second Circuit.
27 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 399 (1989).
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analysis and have suggested renaming the “malicious prosecution” claim
accordingly.28
That numerous federal courts require wrongfully convicted plaintiffs to
prove malice is problematic in two fundamental and inextricably linked
ways: (1) a malice requirement strips § 1983 of a core purpose and power —
to hold accountable state actors who unintentionally, but unreasonably and
wrongfully, deprive individuals of their right to liberty; and (2) a malice
requirement simultaneously disregards the lessons of cognitive psychology
— that unintentional yet unreasonable acts drive many wrongful convictions
and must be addressed if we are to reform the criminal justice system.
Moreover, as a consequence of the malice requirement, malicious prosecu-
tion claims are among the hardest causes of action to prove.29
While the courts rejecting a malice requirement recognize the first
problem, they neglect the second one entirely.  To fill this significant gap,
this Article uses cognitive science to explain that the need for a change in
the prevailing legal standard is not merely a theoretical one, because reality
— how wrongful convictions occur in the world — requires it, if we are to
have a chance at true criminal justice reform.
Neglecting cognitive science and the reformist origins of § 1983 comes
at a high cost.  Even after wrongly pursued criminal charges have been dis-
missed, the government typically does not acknowledge its culpability, let
alone offer its wrongfully convicted victims resources for reentering soci-
ety.30  Thus, it is particularly critical that individuals like Wong have mean-
ingful access to monetary reparations for lost years of liberty and emotional
well-being.  Section 1983 waits on the back end, after the criminal justice
system and its operators have already failed most miserably, to provide
plaintiffs with some compensation for their injuries.31  Moreover, § 1983 ac-
28 See infra notes 72–83 and accompanying text. R
29 “Malicious prosecution is one of the most difficult causes of action to prove and many
cases go down in flames by a directed verdict if not sooner by a summary judgment.  The
reason for this is the requirement that defendant’s institution of either civil or criminal proceed-
ings be dictated by malice.”  1 LOUIS A. LEHR, JR., PREMISES LIABILITY 3D § 2:18 (2014 ed.)
(emphasis added).
30 See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 512, 518 (2007) (“In many of the recent exoneration cases, for exam-
ple, prosecutors have continued to insist that the exonerated defendant is guilty, even when
exculpatory DNA evidence undermines the government’s initial case.”); Steven A. Drizin &
Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV.
891, 898–900 (2004) (noting that during the infamous Central Park Jogger case, even after
DNA testing confirmed the true rapist’s confession, former prosecutors and the police depart-
ment criticized the district attorney’s office for moving to vacate and set aside the wrongful
convictions).  The government’s imperviousness to exoneration is yet another example of cog-
nitive bias.
31 “Malicious prosecution” claims pursuant to § 1983 are an essential source of compen-
sation for the wrongfully convicted.  The following twenty states do not have compensation
statutes of their own: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Wyoming. Compensating the Wrongly Con-
victed, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Oct. 10, 2014, 9:20 AM), http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-
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tions, including “malicious prosecution” claims, can lead to systemic reform
— indirectly, by attaching a heavy fiscal price to wrongful convictions
(through both damages and attorneys’ fees32), as well as directly, through
injunctive relief against institutions.
For § 1983 to achieve its full potential as a meaningful source of mone-
tary compensation and systemic reform in the malicious prosecution context,
it must tie liability to the types of nonmalicious cognitive errors that fre-
quently taint the various phases of criminal proceedings.  This Article pro-
poses an objective “unreasonable prosecution” standard that would ask
whether a state actor is engaged in conduct reasonably likely to lead to an
accurate conviction.  Such a standard would make relevant for individual
liability purposes whether a defendant submitted to cognitive biases that led
to unreasonable decisions in the criminal investigation and prosecution
processes.  In addition, attention to the cognitive psychology behind wrong-
ful convictions would open a new avenue to plaintiffs for pursuing munici-
pal liability.  Though unintentional, tunnel vision is triggered and
exacerbated by systemic practices that states establish and can influence, and
tunnel vision can be mitigated through education and debiasing strategies.
Accordingly, plaintiffs could challenge not only individual state actions
stemming from cognitive bias, but also municipal policies that systemically
generate wrongful convictions by fostering or failing to mitigate cognitive
bias.
These changes would better reflect human behavior as we understand it
today, would give plaintiffs an improved chance of securing some civil jus-
tice after years of wrongful incarceration, and would honor § 1983 by en-
couraging states to remedy patterns and practices that lead to wrongful
convictions.  Given the lack of uniformity in federal “malicious prosecu-
tion” jurisprudence, there is plenty of room to envision such an alternative.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I sets out the prevailing legal
standard for federal “malicious prosecution” claims, which requires a show-
ing of “malice,” and uses Fourth and Sixth Circuit jurisprudence to describe
a preferable alternative — the “objective reasonableness” standard that de-
rives from the Fourth Amendment.  Accordingly, Part I proposes a shift in
terminology from “malicious prosecution” to “unreasonable prosecution,”
while recognizing the need to shape an “objective reasonableness” standard
that is less deferential to the government than current jurisprudence.  Part II
uses cognitive psychology as a tool to shape the “objective reasonableness”
standard in the wrongful conviction context, describing the kinds of cogni-
innocent/improve-the-law/fact-sheets/compensating-the-wrongly-convicted, archived at http://
perma.cc/PYH4-H63D.  Moreover, existing compensation statutes fail to provide adequate
compensation. See id.
32 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012) (authorizing courts to award reasonable attorneys’ fees
to the prevailing party in a § 1983 action).  Such fees have become an integral part of § 1983
remedies. See MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & KATHRYN R. URBONYA, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 3
(2d ed. 2008), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sec19832.pdf/$file/sec19
832.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WR3E-EHSU.
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tive distortions that lead to wrongful convictions.  Part III applies the con-
cepts explained in Part II to the facts of the Wong case to illustrate how they
operate and how they could be useful for obtaining civil relief pursuant to
§ 1983 against individual defendants.  Part IV uses cognitive psychology to
propose a new avenue of relief against municipal defendants.
I. SECTION 1983 “MALICIOUS PROSECUTION” IS A FOURTH AMENDMENT
CLAIM, REQUIRING PROOF OF OBJECTIVE UNREASONABLENESS,
RATHER THAN MALICIOUS INTENT
A. Section 1983 is a Vehicle for Reform of State Practices
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 187133 in response to the fail-
ure of southern state police and state courts to control the Ku Klux Klan’s
rampant violence against African Americans.34  Section 1 of that Act is now
embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which authorizes private parties to enforce
their federal constitutional rights, and some federal statutory rights, against
defendants who act under color of state law.35  Section 1983 does not itself
establish any federally protected rights.36  Rather, the statute provides plain-
tiffs with a cause of action for enforcing federal rights already established by
the Constitution or by other federal statutes.37
Section 1983 makes a wide range of federal constitutional rights en-
forceable against state defendants.  For example, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, these rights include substantive and procedural due process, the
equal protection of the laws, and rights incorporated from the Bill of Rights
by the Due Process Clause.38  “These incorporated rights include rights pro-
tected by the First Amendment free speech and religion clauses . . . , the
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures,
and the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual
punishment.”39
33 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
34 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.2 (6th ed. 2012); MARTIN A.
SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 1.03 (4th ed. 2003 & Supp. I
2015), available at Westlaw SNETLCD.
35 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, §§ 1.01, 1.04.  Section 1983 reads as follows: R
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
36 SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, § 1.05. R
37 Id.
38 SCHWARTZ & URBONYA, supra note 32, at 24. R
39 Id.
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In Monroe v. Pape,40 the United States Supreme Court articulated a
critical purpose of § 1983:
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed
was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of
prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance, or otherwise, state laws
might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment
of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.41
Thus, Congress “interpose[d] the federal courts between the States and the
people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights.”42
With the Monroe decision, § 1983 became the vehicle for constitutional
litigation against state officials.  At first, § 1983 plaintiffs sought monetary
damages against individual state officials.43  Over time, plaintiffs also began
to sue state officials for prospective injunctive relief, and to name cities and
counties as defendants.44  Although the Eleventh Amendment precludes
§ 1983 suits against nonconsenting states, potential defendants include local
and municipal entities violating the law through policies, custom or practice,
inadequate training, or inadequate hiring.45  “Ultimately, the federal court
became the place to reform state and local governmental practices.”46
B. Federal “Malicious Prosecution” is a Fourth Amendment Claim
In theory and purpose, § 1983 provides federal courts a valuable oppor-
tunity to reform state criminal justice systems that otherwise trample on
criminal defendants’ civil rights.  Potential constitutionally based claims
against state law enforcement include excessive force, abuse of civil process,
false arrest, unreasonable search, and malicious prosecution.47  Malicious
prosecution is the subject of this Article.
In the United States, malicious prosecution emerged after the Revolu-
tionary War from English law as a common law tort to remedy the misuse of
40 365 U.S. 167 (1961), rev’d on other grounds, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978).
41 Id. at 180.  The Monroe Court also articulated the purposes of § 1983 as follows: (1) to
“override certain kinds of state laws,” (2) to provide “a remedy where state law was inade-
quate,” and (3) “to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in
theory, was not available in practice.” Id. at 173–74.
42 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
43 SCHWARTZ & URBONYA, supra note 32, at 2.  Qualified immunity doctrine has made it R
more difficult to prevail against government officials performing discretionary functions, gen-
erally shielding them from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
44 SCHWARTZ & URBONYA, supra note 32, at 2. R
45 1 STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS § 15:5 (2014).
46 SCHWARTZ & URBONYA, supra note 32, at 2. R
47 SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, §§ 3.12, 3.15–.16, 3.18–.19, 3.21. R
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criminal process.48  Because § 1983 does not create or establish any federal
rights, but rather makes liable state actors who deprive others of rights se-
cured by the United States Constitution,49 a claim of malicious prosecution is
only actionable under § 1983 if it encompasses a violation of a particular
constitutional right.50  Federal “malicious prosecution” jurisprudence has
been far from coherent or uniform in addressing whether malicious prosecu-
tion triggers certain constitutional provisions and, if so, which ones.
In Albright v. Oliver,51 the Supreme Court spoke disjointedly on the
question of which constitutional principles govern § 1983 malicious prose-
cution claims, leaving the circuits without clear guidance.52  The Albright
plurality ruled that an arrested individual may base a claim of criminal pros-
ecution without probable cause only on the Fourth Amendment, not on sub-
stantive due process.53  Using a different rationale, Justice Souter came to the
same conclusion.54  Accordingly, most lower courts have required that a
plaintiff base her § 1983 malicious prosecution claim on the Fourth Amend-
ment, and prove that she suffered a significant deprivation of liberty between
arraignment and dismissal of her criminal charges.55  Confusion nonetheless
prevails because the Supreme Court has “never explored the contours of a
Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution suit under § 1983.”56
This Article assumes that the Fourth Amendment governs the full range
of violations by state actors that lead to wrongful convictions — from arrest
through the postconviction dismissal of charges.57  In addition to joining the
Albright plurality, Justice Ginsburg authored a concurrence interpreting the
Fourth Amendment’s reach in just this way.58  Justice Ginsburg opined that
“seizure” under the Fourth Amendment encompasses not only false arrest,
but also other methods by which the state retains control over a defendant’s
person, including through criminal charges to which a defendant must an-
48 Jacques L. Schillaci, Note, Unexamined Premises: Toward Doctrinal Purity in Section
1983 Malicious Prosecution Doctrine, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 439, 443–46 (2002).
49 SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, § 1.05; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). R
50 SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, § 3.18.  Since there is no federal statute prohibiting mali- R
cious prosecution, the fact that § 1983 also provides a cause of action for enforcing federal
statutory rights, see supra note 37 and accompanying text, is not relevant here. R
51 510 U.S. 266 (1994).
52 See generally id. (six separate, nonmajority opinions); see also MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ
& GEORGE C. PRATT, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 8.03[A] (2014)
(describing post-Albright uncertainty across the circuits).
53 Albright, 510 U.S. at 271–75 (plurality opinion).
54 See id. at 286–89 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
55 See SCHWARTZ & PRATT, supra note 52, § 8.03[A]. R
56 Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 390 n.2 (2007).
57 The Supreme Court has concluded that “malicious prosecution” is “entirely distinct”
from “false arrest” because malicious prosecution “remedies detention accompanied not by
absence of legal process, but by wrongful institution of legal process.” Id. at 390.  Although
this Article focuses on federal malicious prosecution claims because many courts use an im-
proper standard to adjudicate them, other potential § 1983 claims following a wrongful convic-
tion include false arrest and due process violations.
58 See generally Albright, 510 U.S. at 276–81 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\50-2\HLC204.txt unknown Seq: 11 23-JUL-15 14:09
2015] Removing Malice 369
swer in court.59  Thus, a defendant remains “effectively ‘seized’ for trial so
long as the prosecution against him remain[s] pending.”60  By the same ra-
tionale, if an officer gives misleading testimony at a hearing, “that testimony
serve[s] to maintain and reinforce the unlawful haling of [the defendant]
into court, and so perpetuate[s] the Fourth Amendment violation.”61
Justice Ginsburg emphasized that “this conception of a seizure and its
course recognizes that the vitality of the Fourth Amendment depends upon
its constant observance by police officers.”62  It is this broad conception of
the Fourth Amendment’s scope that animates the rest of the discussion in this
Article.  Since § 1983 “malicious prosecution” actions review state actors’
conduct from arraignment to the postconviction dismissal of charges, it is
critical to consider the factors that contribute to wrongful convictions at each
of these stages.
C. Objective Reasonableness, Rather than Subjective Intent, is the
Correct Test for Federal “Malicious Prosecution” Claims
Fending for themselves, lower federal courts frequently have used the
elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution to assess § 1983
“malicious prosecution” claims.63  The Fifth Circuit has described two
broad, but closely related, approaches in the circuit courts.64  One approach
requires proof of all common law elements of malicious prosecution, usually
based on the law of the state where the offense occurred, as well as proof of
a constitutional violation such as deprivation of liberty under the Fourth
Amendment.65  The second approach views common law malicious prosecu-
tion as unenforceable under § 1983, but looks to the common law elements
of the tort as needed to assist the enforcement of analogous constitutional
violations, such as seizures under the Fourth Amendment.66
The four common law elements required under the first approach vary
across jurisdictions in terms of specific wording and analytical nuance, but
generally can be summarized as follows: (1) the defendant instituted or sup-
ported a criminal proceeding against the plaintiff; (2) the proceeding termi-
nated in the plaintiff’s favor (for example, by a dismissal of charges or a
finding of not guilty); (3) there was no probable cause to support the defen-
59 Id. at 277–79.
60 Id. at 280.
61 Id. at 279.
62 Id.
63 See SCHWARTZ & PRATT, supra note 52, § 8.03[A]. R
64 See Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 949 (5th Cir. 2003).
65 Id. at 949–50; see, e.g., Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1256 (11th Cir. 2010);
Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 160–61 (2d Cir. 2010); McKenna v. City of
Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 461 (3d Cir. 2009); Lassiter v. City of Bremerton, 556 F.3d 1049,
1054 (9th Cir. 2009); Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 799 (10th Cir. 2008).
66 See, e.g., Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308–10 (6th Cir. 2010); Brooks v. City of
Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 184 n.5 (4th Cir. 1996).
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dant’s charges; and (4) the defendant’s actions were malicious or motivated
by something other than bringing the guilty to justice.67
This Article challenges courts’ incorporation of the fourth requirement
into federal, Fourth Amendment-based “malicious prosecution” claims.  As
elaborated below, by focusing on a defendant’s subjective state of mind,
courts squander the opportunity instead to examine whether the defendant
acted in a manner reasonably likely to lead to an accurate conviction — the
inquiry most appropriate under the Fourth Amendment and most likely to
reform state criminal justice systems that generate wrongful convictions in a
haze of cognitive distortions.
A plurality of circuits has erred on this score.  Transposing common law
into § 1983 liability, the Second, Third, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
have specifically ruled that malice is an element of a § 1983 malicious pros-
ecution claim.68  Under common law:
[Malice] has been variously defined as: the intent, without justifi-
cation or excuse, to commit a wrongful act; ill will, evil motive,
gross indifference, or reckless disregard of the rights of others; ill
will in the sense of spite, lack of belief by the actor himself in the
propriety of the prosecution, or its use for an extraneous improper
purpose; and making a charge with knowledge that it is false or
with reckless disregard for the truth.69
Malice extends to proceedings “instituted primarily for an improper pur-
pose,” even in the absence of “actual hostility, ill will, or a grudge or desire
for revenge toward the plaintiff.”70  Malice may be inferred from “mere
wantonness or carelessness if the actor, when doing the act, knows it to be
wrong or unlawful.”71  This attention to the subjective state of mind of the
state actor — albeit on a definitional spectrum from evil motive to reckless,
67 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, § 3.18; Schillaci, supra note 48, at 445. R
68 See Grider, 618 F.3d at 1256 n.24; Manganiello, 612 F.3d at 160–61; McKenna, 582
F.3d at 461; Lassiter, 556 F.3d at 1054; Wilkins, 528 F.3d at 799; see also Kingsland v. City of
Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1234–35 (11th Cir. 2004); Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062,
1067 (9th Cir. 2004).
69 4 HOWARD FRIEDMAN & CHARLES J. DIMARE, LITIGATING TORT CASES § 50:37 (2013)
(footnotes omitted); see also Manganiello, 612 F.3d at 163 (holding that “malice may be
shown by proving that the prosecution at issue was undertaken from improper or wrongful
motives, or in reckless disregard of the rights of the plaintiff”); Wilkins, 528 F.3d at 801
(holding that the malice element can be met if it is proven that officers knowingly relied on
false evidence).
70 FRIEDMAN & DIMARE, supra note 69. R
71 Id.  Malice may also be inferred from an obvious lack of probable cause. Id.  Professor
Dan Dobbs, however, has warned against conflating probable cause and malice issues, reason-
ing that “if malice or improper purpose can be inferred anytime probable cause is lacking, then
malice does not look like an independent element of the plaintiff’s case at all.  The Restatement
has accordingly attempted to limit the inference to cases in which the lack of probable cause
shows the accuser did not believe the charges he brought.” DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW
OF TORTS § 589 (2d ed. 2014).  That some courts nonetheless conflate probable cause and
malice issues does not quiet this Author’s concerns.  Whether courts employ the malice stan-
dard directly or indirectly, by failing to assess the reasonableness of state actors’ conduct
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or conscious, disregard — is in friction with this Article’s contention that
even unconscious processes leading to the objectively unreasonable actions
of state actors should factor into what has traditionally been termed a “mali-
cious prosecution.”
While requiring “malice” to prove “malicious prosecution” may seem
logical as a matter of linguistics, at least two circuits have recognized that
the surface appeal of this approach is misguided.  Indeed, the Fourth and
Sixth Circuits have explicitly rejected the malice element, reasoning that
federal claims traditionally labeled “malicious prosecution” require a show-
ing of an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment,72 which is not
concerned with a defendant’s subjective state of mind.73  These circuits fol-
low Supreme Court precedent holding that “[t]he Fourth Amendment in-
quiry is one of ‘objective reasonableness’ under the circumstances, and
subjective concepts like ‘malice’ and ‘sadism’ have no proper place in that
inquiry.”74
In Sykes v. Anderson,75 the Sixth Circuit articulated with specificity for
the first time the elements of a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.76  In doing so, the court excluded the com-
mon law malice element, critiquing circuits that require malice for failing to
recognize an independent constitutional tort actionable under § 1983:
This circuit has never required that a plaintiff demonstrate
“malice” in order to prevail on a Fourth Amendment claim for
malicious prosecution, and we join the Fourth Circuit in declining
to impose that requirement.  The circuits that require malice have
imported elements from the common law without reflecting on
their consistency with the overriding constitutional nature of
§ 1983 claims.  Common-law and § 1983 claims have different
foundations.  As the Supreme Court explained in Albright v. Oli-
ver, “the constitutional tort 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes stands on
its own, influenced by the substance, but not tied to the formal
categories and procedures, of the common law.”77
through a cognitive science lens, they miss a critical opportunity to address the true causes of
wrongful convictions.
72 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  A “seizure” triggering the Fourth Amendment’s protec-
tions occurs only when government actors have, “by means of physical force or show of
authority, . . . in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.”  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19
n.16 (1968); see also Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (“A seizure occurs
even when an unintended person or thing is the object of the detention or taking, but the
detention or taking itself must be willful.” (citations omitted)).
73 See Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 309–10 (6th Cir. 2010); Brooks v. City of Win-
ston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 184 n.5 (4th Cir. 1996).
74 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 399 (1989).
75 625 F.3d 294 (6th Cir. 2010).
76 Id. at 308–09.
77 Id. at 309 (citations omitted) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 277 n.1 (1994)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring)); see also Frantz v. Village of Bradford, 245 F.3d 869, 874–75 (6th
Cir. 2001) (holding that “Albright precludes reliance on state law to define § 1983 federal
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The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have emphasized that, for a malicious
prosecution claim to be actionable under § 1983, it must support a violation
of the Fourth Amendment without probing a defendant’s mental state.  Spe-
cifically, the Sixth Circuit said, “the Fourth Amendment violation that gen-
erates a § 1983 cause of action obviates the need for demonstrating malice
. . . [because] Fourth Amendment jurisprudence makes clear that we should
not delve into the defendants’ intent.”78  Relying on the Supreme Court, the
Fourth Circuit in Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem79 similarly concluded that
“the reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment should be
analyzed from an objective perspective,” such that “the subjective state of
mind of the defendant, whether good faith or ill will, is irrelevant.”80
That circuit courts overwhelmingly continue to conflate the common
law and constitutional torts reinforces what the Sixth Circuit recognized —
that “designating the constitutional claim one for ‘malicious prosecution’ is
both unfortunate and confusing.”81  Instead, the Sixth Circuit proposed that
“unreasonable prosecutorial seizure” might better “grasp the essence of this
cause of action under applicable Fourth Amendment principles.”82  The court
had also previously described malicious prosecution claims under the Fourth
Amendment as “encompass[ing] wrongful investigation, prosecution, con-
viction, and incarceration.”83
The Fourth and Sixth Circuits’ focus on the objective wrongs generated
by our criminal justice system, whether those wrongs are malicious or not,
circles back to the original purpose of § 1983 — to protect individuals from
civil rights abuses perpetuated by entrenched state practices.84  The malice
requirement is a byproduct of the rich common law history of the malicious
prosecution tort, which evolved largely to hold accountable private citizens
who lay baseless charges, without punishing the “honest but ignorant ac-
cuser.”85  This history does not apply to claims based on § 1983, which
“aimed not only at state officials who intentionally deprived citizens of their
cause of action” and rejecting “the reasoning of courts which have relied on the state law
elements of malicious prosecution”); Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d at 301, 311–12 (6th
Cir. 2001) (confirming that the above-quoted language in Frantz survived abrogation).
78 Sykes, 625 F.3d at 309.
79 85 F.3d 178 (4th Cir. 1996).
80 Id. at 184 n.5 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989)).
81 Sykes, 625 F.3d at 310 (emphasis added) (quoting Frantz, 245 F.3d at 881 (Gilman, J.,
dissenting)); see also Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[I]f a plain-
tiff can establish a violation of the fourth (or any other) amendment there is nothing but confu-
sion to be gained by calling the legal theory ‘malicious prosecution.’”).
82 Sykes, 625 F.3d at 310 (quoting Frantz, 245 F.3d at 881 (Gilman, J., dissenting)).
83 Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 716 (6th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).
84 As acknowledged infra section I.D, the “objective reasonableness” standard is far from
a panacea as currently applied by courts.  Indeed, for it to be more than another mechanism for
insulating all but the most obviously incompetent state actors from liability, it must be signifi-
cantly reconceived.
85 Schillaci, supra note 48, at 468. R
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rights, but also at state actors who simply failed to protect such rights.”86
The state officials targeted by § 1983 are “repeat players” whose actions,
whether stemming from malignant intent or negligence, have a tremendous
impact that must be curtailed by states through improved training of its law
enforcement personnel and other measures designed to reduce the likelihood
of wrongful convictions.87  Reliance on the intent element of the malicious
prosecution tort allows state actors to escape consequence even as they con-
tinuously generate inaccurate convictions that epitomize the wrongs § 1983
called on federal courts to correct.88
D. The Correct Standard Should Examine State Conduct in Terms of Its
Reasonable Likelihood to Lead to Accurate Investigations
and Prosecutions, Regardless of Typicality
This Article embraces the reasonableness standard cautiously, and with
a number of caveats, due to significant flaws in the standard’s application.
Other commentators have concluded that reasonableness review in the
Fourth Amendment context is highly deferential to the government, with
courts finding state conduct reasonable as long as they “can identify any
plausible goal or reason that promotes law enforcement.”89  Such deference
contradicts the goal of § 198390 and the Fourth Amendment91 to hold state
power in check, and is antithetical to the reformist aspirations of this Article.
Moreover, the reasonableness standard remains ill-defined, generally
leaving courts unbridled discretion to balance the interests of the govern-
ment against those of the individual.92  Courts are thus free to issue inconsis-
tent rulings and to defer to the state, considering and disregarding particular
circumstances as they see fit.93  Courts are also free, as feminist and critical
race theorists have warned, to turn the purportedly objective reasonableness
86 Id. at 470 (citing the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and contemporary congressional
hearings).
87 Id.
88 See id. at 442, 465–66 (citing RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 413 (2001) (“Fourth Amendment law is generally structured so as to make police
motive irrelevant . . . .”)), 468–71.
89 Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 197, 200 (1993); see also Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth
Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1147–48 (2012).
90 See supra section I.A.
91 Lee, supra note 89, at 1148. R
92 Id. at 1149.
93 See id.; Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth? The Framers Preserved Com-
mon-Law Criminal Arrest and Search Rules in “Due Process of Law” — “Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness” Is Only a Modern, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 51, 55
(2010) (“The beauty of ‘Fourth Amendment reasonableness’ — at least from the [J]ustices’
points of view — is that it can carry whatever content the [J]ustices choose to give it.”);
Gerald S. Reamey, When “Special Needs” Meet Probable Cause: Denying the Devil Benefit of
Law, 19 TEX. HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295, 299–300, 327 (1992) (arguing the reasonableness
standard results in “ad-hoc and unprincipled” decisionmaking).
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standard into a vehicle of judges’ own biases, as they view what is reasona-
ble myopically — generally through white, male, wealthy eyes.94
While I share these significant concerns about the fairness of the rea-
sonableness standard, I take a pragmatic approach.  The Supreme Court is
not likely to discard the reasonableness test anytime soon, so developing
guidelines for reasonableness assessment may be a more practical reform to
the “malicious prosecution” claim.  For instance, Professor Cynthia Lee has
advanced a “reasonableness with teeth” standard in the search and seizure
context, arguing that factors for assessing reasonableness should be set out
in advance to ensure that courts subject government claims of reasonable-
ness to rigorous scrutiny.95
To assess whether the government acted reasonably in investigating and
prosecuting what ultimately proves a wrongful conviction, this Article pro-
poses that courts objectively consider whether government actors made
choices reasonably likely to lead to an accurate determination of guilt.  As
illustrated below, cognitive science can help identify and explain unreasona-
ble state action and thereby aid courts in conducting rigorous scrutiny.
This paradigm consciously distinguishes typical behavior from reasona-
ble behavior.  That is, while cognitive bias is typical of the human condition,
it may nonetheless amount to unreasonable state conduct in the prosecution
context when it systematically leads to conviction of the innocent.  Professor
Jody Armour draws a similar line between typicality and reasonableness in
the context of racism.96  Professor Armour rejects arguments of the “Reason-
able Racist,” who considers her victim’s race before using force because she
believes African Americans are prone to violence, but claims she should be
excused for acting with prejudice because most similarly situated Americans
would do the same.97  While Professor Armour grudgingly admits that “it is
unrealistic to dispute the depressing conclusion that, for many Americans,
crime has a black face,”98 she condemns the “Reasonable Racist’s” self-
defense claim for assuming that the sole objective of criminal law is to pun-
ish those who deviate from statistically defined norms.99  She concludes that
“not all ‘typical’ beliefs are per se reasonable” because the reasonableness
inquiry considers social interests, including accuracy and moral justification,
that typical beliefs may not advance.100
Just as typical racist beliefs may be unreasonable because they are inac-
curate and morally blameworthy, cognitive biases are unreasonable when
they systematically lead to conviction of the innocent — the essence of
94 See Lee, supra note 89, at 1150; Dana Raigrodski, Reasonableness and Objectivity: A R
Feminist Discourse of the Fourth Amendment, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 153, 187 (2008).
95 Lee, supra note 89, at 1160. R
96 Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and
Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 787–90 (1994).
97 Id. at 787–88.
98 Id. at 787.
99 Id. at 787–88.
100 Id. at 788.
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profound inaccuracy and moral reprehensibility.  While the “Reasonable Ra-
cist” might argue that blame should be reserved for the statistically deviant,
Professor George Fletcher has noted that the actual moral norm implicit in
the analogous “reasonable man test” is that blame applies to those who fail
to overcome character flaws that they fairly can be expected to surmount for
the sake of important social interests.101  State actors who accept the highly
consequential role of shaping a criminal defendant’s fate, and who operate in
a system long plagued by errors leading to wrongful convictions, must be
expected to acknowledge and surmount the influence of cognitive biases for
the sake of important social interests in fairness and liberty.
E. Application of the “Malice” Requirement in David Wong’s § 1983
Action Improperly Shifted the Focus Away from Cognitive Bias,
the Likeliest Cause of Wrongful Conviction
On October 18, 2007, Wong filed a federal action in the Northern Dis-
trict of New York pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, inter alia, mali-
cious prosecution against prison personnel Richard LaPierre, Roger Nelson,
Joseph Wood, and John D. Carey, as well as state investigator Thomas
Hickey.102  The court evaluated the record on the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment for evidence of every element of a common law mali-
cious prosecution tort, including “malice.”103  To find malice, the court
looked for inferential proof of the defendants’ overtly intentional conduct —
fabrication of evidence, falsification of inculpatory testimony and state-
ments, and concealment of exculpatory evidence.104
The malice standard, and the attending focus on questions of intention-
ality, obscured the forces more likely at play in Wong’s conviction — sys-
temic cognitive biases that scientists tell us commonly drive wrongful
convictions.105  As the defendants denied intentional wrongdoing, they es-
caped confronting the institutional problems sure to cause future wrongful
convictions.
101 George P. Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV.
1269, 1291 (1974).  While Professors Armour and Fletcher rest their analyses on the subjective
“reasonable person test” applicable to tort and criminal law, Armour, supra note 96, at 789, R
the same concepts would seem applicable to the ill-defined Fourth Amendment objective rea-
sonableness test.  In the Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness context — as in the
reasonable person context — the consideration of important social interests naturally enters the
balancing test.  Actions and decisions leading to wrongful conviction have such a high social
cost that they arguably tip the scales toward a sort of strict liability.
102 Wong v. LaPierre, No. 8:07-CV-1110, slip op. at. 2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2011) (order
granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment).  The ability to assert a § 1983 claim
against officers who furnish information to prosecutors is particularly important, given that
prosecutors are likely to have absolute prosecutorial immunity.
103 Id. at 33.
104 Id. at 32–33.
105 Specific cognitive biases are identified and defined infra Part II, and applied directly to
the Wong case infra Part III.
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The Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” test imposes a
different, more appropriate, burden for federal “malicious prosecution” ac-
tions.  An objective standard is also, as it turns out, a more accurate way to
hold state actors accountable for the unintentional or unconscious, yet still
unreasonable, conduct that often drives wrongful convictions in our criminal
justice system.  Below, this Article uses concepts from cognitive science to
explain why unintentional, wrongful conduct so commonly propels criminal
prosecutions, and then uses the Wong case to demonstrate how courts might
employ these concepts to assess whether the state actors behind wrongful
convictions acted reasonably.
II. SYSTEMICALLY DRIVEN COGNITIVE BIASES LEAD TO
“U NREASONABLE PROSECUTIONS”
The Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard has the
potential to target inaccurate and unreliable prosecutions, rather than just
badly motivated ones.  In electing to require malice and fixate on such mark-
ers as intentional fabrication or falsification, a majority of courts has turned
a blind eye to the more common, systemic causes of wrongful convictions
and therefore perpetuated those causes.  Reform requires judges and juries to
examine evidence of “malicious prosecution” in terms of state actors’ fail-
ures to exercise reason in pursuing a prosecution.  Cognitive psychologists
provide a vocabulary and explanations for unintentional, faulty thought
processes that, by definition, lead to objectively unreasonable conduct by
state actors.  In identifying these processes, we can create some parameters
for the reasonableness standard.
A. Cognitive Distortions Pervade All Phases of the Criminal Process
(From Investigation to Postconviction)
Professors Findley and Scott argue that cognitive distortions taint the
criminal justice process from the start — during the police investigation of a
criminal case — and continue to infect all phases of criminal proceedings
through postconviction.106  They contend that these distortions, including
confirmation bias and hindsight bias, result in “tunnel vision,”107 which they
describe as follows:
Tunnel vision is a natural human tendency that has particu-
larly pernicious effects in the criminal justice system. . . . This
process leads investigators, prosecutors, judges, and defense law-
yers alike to focus on a particular conclusion and then filter all
evidence in a case through the lens provided by that conclusion.
Through that filter, all information supporting the adopted conclu-
106 Findley & Scott, supra note 11, at 295. R
107 Id. at 307–08.
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sion is elevated in significance, viewed as consistent with the other
evidence, and deemed relevant and probative.  Evidence inconsis-
tent with the chosen theory is easily overlooked or dismissed as
irrelevant, incredible, or unreliable.  Properly understood, tunnel
vision is more often the product of the human condition as well as
institutional and cultural pressures, than of maliciousness or
indifference.108
Other scholars, as well as most official inquiries into specific wrongful con-
victions, have also attributed wrongful convictions, in major part, to tunnel
vision.109
Significantly, that tunnel vision is often unintentional does not mean
state actors lack culpability or are doomed to convict the innocent.  As ex-
plained above, under the Fourth Amendment, culpability does not depend on
intentionality.110  Moreover, to the extent holding individual state actors fi-
nancially responsible for unconscious wrongdoing is objectionable on policy
grounds, government indemnification practices have an answer.  Individual
state actors who are found liable for “malicious prosecution” are unlikely to
pay damages to plaintiffs out of their own pockets, particularly if, as this
Article urges, the malice requirement is eliminated.
Indeed, in a recent empirical study of the indemnification practices in
forty-four of the largest law enforcement agencies across the country, and in
thirty-seven small and midsized agencies, Professor Joanna Schwartz found
that governments paid approximately 99.98% of the dollars plaintiffs recov-
ered in § 1983 (and related tort-based) lawsuits alleging civil rights viola-
tions by law enforcement.111  The law enforcement officers in Professor
Schwartz’s study “almost never contributed anything to settlements or judg-
ments — even when indemnification was prohibited by law or policy, and
even when officers were disciplined, terminated, or prosecuted for their con-
duct.”112  Indemnification would seem an even greater certainty where law
enforcement officers are adjudged to have acted objectively unreasonably
due to unintentional cognitive bias:
108 Id. at 292 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
109 See, e.g., BILL KURTIS, THE DEATH PENALTY ON TRIAL: CRISIS IN AMERICAN JUSTICE
33 (2004) (“Perhaps the most common fault with criminal investigations is their failure to
explore all the possible suspects.  When attention begins to focus on a single individual, too
often the detectives are called off the general hunt to go after the single target.  Tunnel vision
sets in.”); Martin, supra note 20, at 848; James McCloskey, Commentary, Convicting the R
Innocent, 8 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 2, 56 (1989).  As early as 1958, before wrongful convictions
were widely recognized, the American Bar Association and the Association of American Law
Schools recognized that “what starts as a preliminary diagnosis designed to direct the inquiry
tends, quickly and imperceptibly, to become a fixed conclusion, as all that confirms the diag-
nosis makes a strong imprint on the mind, while all that runs counter to it is received with
diverted attention.”  ABA Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, Professional Re-
sponsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160 (1958).
110 See supra notes 72–88 and accompanying text. R
111 Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 936–37 (2014).
112 Id. at 885, 890.
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Though the language in [indemnification] statutes varies from
state to state, they “commonly require that to be entitled to indem-
nification, the employee must (1) have acted within the scope of
employment, and (2) not have engaged in intentional, reckless, or
malicious wrongdoing.”  As a result, “the state or local govern-
ment officer who is acting within the scope of his or her employ-
ment in something other than extreme bad faith can count on
government defense and indemnification.”113
Thus, those convinced that true culpability for wrongful convictions caused
by cognitive bias lies with the state should rest assured that the state will
also bear the loss in virtually all federal malicious prosecution actions won
by plaintiffs.114
Finally, as discussed below,115 systemic factors over which state offi-
cials have control exacerbate and encourage cognitive distortions.  There is
serious culpability in the perpetuation of systems known to lead to inaccura-
cies so profound that the innocent are convicted.  The hope is that a legal
standard linking the true sources of these inaccuracies to liability — through
individual and municipal liability — would encourage and require states to
make the kinds of systemic changes necessary to improve the accuracy of
criminal investigations, prosecutions, and convictions.
113 John P. Taddei, Beyond Absolute Immunity: Alternative Protections for Prosecutors
Against Ultimate Liability for § 1983 Suits, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1883, 1914 (2012) (footnotes
omitted) (quoting, respectively, Martin A. Schwartz, Should Juries Be Informed that Munici-
pality Will Indemnify Officer’s § 1983 Liability for Constitutional Wrongdoing?, 86 IOWA L.
REV. 1209, 1217 (2001), and John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and
Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 50 (1998)).  Although removing the intentionality component
from malicious prosecution claims theoretically could lead governments to raise the indemnifi-
cation threshold correspondingly, as a practical matter, indemnification is virtually universal
regardless of black-letter standards.
114 Plaintiffs’ lawyers are likely to be concerned with a more preliminary issue — whether
a Fourth Amendment claim anchored in cognitive bias theory could survive the qualified im-
munity argument that defendants’ conduct did not violate “clearly established statutory or con-
stitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,” because cognitive bias is
largely unconscious.  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  The response to this
concern is twofold.  First, it has been established that a prolonged detention is unconstitutional
where it is caused by significant investigative errors (like those in the Wong case), including
“law enforcement officials’ mishandling or suppression of exculpatory evidence in a manner
which ‘shocks the conscience.’”  Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 211 (2d Cir.
2007) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 (1979)).  That cognitive bias is the
reason for such objectively unreasonable conduct, and that defendants may not understand this,
is important to address for the sake of achieving reform of the criminal justice system but
seems beside the point for a qualified immunity analysis.  Second, this Article argues that
municipalities should be held liable for failing to educate their employees about the dangers of
cognitive bias. See infra Part IV.  Perhaps ironically, the more educated state employees be-
come about cognitive bias, the less they will be able to argue that the cause of their investiga-
tive errors should absolve them of liability.
115 See infra section II.A.3.
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Some of the specific cognitive processes leading to tunnel vision in the
criminal justice system, and their perpetuation and exacerbation through sys-
temic state practices, are described below.
1. Confirmation Bias.
According to Dr. Raymond Nickerson, an internationally recognized
cognitive psychologist, “if one were to attempt to identify a single problem-
atic aspect of human reasoning that deserves attention above all others, the
confirmation bias would have to be among the candidates for considera-
tion.”116  Psychologists use the term “confirmation bias” to describe the
human tendency to seek and interpret evidence to support preferred hypothe-
ses or existing expectations and beliefs at the exclusion of alternative pos-
sibilities.117  This filtering process involves the converse as well —
disregarding or avoiding information that could undermine preferred hypoth-
eses and beliefs or that supports alternative possibilities.118 There is substan-
tial empirical evidence that confirmation bias is “extensive and strong and
. . . appears in many guises.”119  Integral to the concept is the notion that
“people can and do engage in case-building unwittingly, without intending
to treat evidence in a biased way or even being aware of doing so.”120  Thus,
it is a cognitive process that is by definition free of intent, malicious or
otherwise.
Confirmation bias has various manifestations, the most common of
which is the focus on a favored hypothesis resulting in failure to interpret
data as evidence of alternative hypotheses.121  Even when treatment of evi-
dence is evenhanded initially, once one takes a position on an issue, the
primary purpose becomes to defend or justify that position.122  Simply form-
ing a hypothesis — such as by naming a suspect in a criminal case — wors-
ens bias, even absent confidence in the hypothesis.123
Related to the first manifestation of confirmation bias is the process of
giving greater weight to information that supports existing beliefs or opin-
ions than to information that undermines those beliefs or opinions, and seek-
ing to discredit or explain away the undermining information.124  “A good
116 Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many
Guises, 1998 REV. OF GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998).
117 Id. at 175, 177.
118 Id. at 177.
119 Id.  Confirmation bias has been found in numerous contexts, including the criminal
justice system, the policy world, medicine, the judiciary, and science. See id. at 190–96; see
also JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 65 (2008).
120 Nickerson, supra note 116, at 176. R
121 Id. at 177–78.
122 Id. at 177.
123 Barbara O’Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors that Aggravate and
Counteract Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 315,
328 (2009).
124 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\50-2\HLC204.txt unknown Seq: 22 23-JUL-15 14:09
380 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 50
deal of empirical research demonstrates that people are incapable of evaluat-
ing the strength of evidence independent of their prior beliefs.”125  Indeed,
people are motivated to defend their beliefs by working hard internally to
refute disconfirming evidence while accepting confirming evidence without
much scrutiny.126  Selectively favoring evidence that supports a named sus-
pect over that which exculpates the suspect or implicates someone else is a
recipe for disaster in a criminal investigation.
In a well-known study demonstrating this bias against disconfirmation,
researchers knew that half their subjects supported the death penalty and
believed in its deterrent effect, while the other half opposed the death pen-
alty and questioned its deterrent effect.127  They asked all of the subjects to
evaluate two studies — one that supported the deterrence efficacy of the
death penalty and one that did not.128  Even though both studies described the
same experimental procedures (only with differing results), the subjects sup-
porting the death penalty justified in detail their conclusion that the pro-
deterrence study was more convincing than the nondeterrence study, while
the death penalty opponents did the opposite.129  Moreover, each group be-
came more entrenched in its original view based on this biased assessment
of the death penalty studies.130
Reinforcing the unintentional nature of these processes, “peo-
ple . . . appear to seek confirmatory information even for hypotheses in
whose truth value they have no vested interest.”131  For example, in one clas-
sic study of confirmation bias in hypothesis-testing, Professor Peter Wason
gave subjects four cards and told them that each one contained a letter on
one side and a number on the other.132  Wason revealed four sides to subjects
— one vowel, one consonant, one even number, and one odd number.133  He
then asked subjects which cards they needed to turn over to test the follow-
ing rule: If a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number on the
other side.134  Subjects overwhelmingly checked just the vowel card or the
vowel and even number cards, demonstrating their pursuit of information
that would confirm the rule.135  Meanwhile, they failed to check the other
125 Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cogni-
tive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1596 (2006).
126 Id. at 1598.
127 Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polar-
ization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONAL-
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2098, 2100 (1979).
128 Id. at 2100.
129 Id. at 2101–03.
130 Id. at 2103–04.
131 Nickerson, supra note 116, at 178. R
132 P.C. Wason, Reasoning About a Rule, 20 Q. J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 273, 273
(1968).
133 Id. at 273.
134 Id. at 273–75.
135 Id. at 273–77.
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side of the odd number card, which might have revealed a vowel that dis-
proved the rule.136
Unlike Professor Wason’s disinterested subjects, police officers and
prosecutors are likely to be invested in their hypotheses about a criminal
case — for various reasons, including publicity, professional role, and empa-
thy with the victim — and therefore are presumably at even greater risk of
overvaluing confirmatory information.137  This would explain, for instance,
the tendency of police and prosecutors in wrongful conviction cases to
search for incriminating evidence against their suspects, without looking at
viable alternative perpetrators.138
Confirmation bias even has the power to influence what we see.
“[W]hat one sees — actually or metaphorically — depends, to no small
extent, on what one looks for and what one expects.”139  Indeed, one may
deduce patterns that aren’t actually present.140  For instance, in one early
study, students’ perceptions of the social qualities (e.g., relative sociability,
friendliness) of a guest lecturer were influenced by what they expected based
on a prior description of the individual.141  In another study, two groups of
people viewed the same videotape of a child taking an academic test; one
group was led to believe the child’s socioeconomic background was ad-
vantaged and the other that it was disadvantaged.142  Forming a hypothesis
about the child’s abilities based on assumptions about the relationship be-
tween socioeconomic status and academic ability and then interpreting the
video accordingly, the former group rated the child’s academic abilities as
above grade level, while the latter group rated the same performance as be-
low grade level.143
In the context of a criminal investigation, confirmation bias can simi-
larly manifest itself in suspect identification on the basis of expected racial,
ethnic, and socioeconomic qualities, which are likely to disfavor minority
and poor individuals.  Drawing on data from four major studies on race and
innocence, one author concluded that a disproportionate percentage of
wrongful convictions involve racial minorities and postulated that this dis-
parity is driven by individual cognitive error and structural power imbal-
ances in society.144  Once potentially false assumptions drive hypotheses,
problematic hypotheses may further drive major investigative flaws.
136 Id. at 276–77.
137 See infra section II.A.3.(a).
138 See Findley & Scott, supra note 11, at 316. R
139 Nickerson, supra note 116, at 182; see also D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/ R
Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation
and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 12–16 (2002).
140 Nickerson, supra note 116, at 181. R
141 Id.
142 Id. at 182.
143 Id.
144 Karen F. Parker, Mari A. Dewees & Michael L. Radelet, Racial Bias and the Convic-
tion of the Innocent, reprinted in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE
114, 127–28 (Saundra D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds., 2001).
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Numerous additional studies have revealed that people not only see, but
also remember, in biased ways.  They tend to recall information that con-
firms expectations stemming from stereotypes, including those based on
ethnicity, education, socioeconomic status, and lifestyle.145  Similarly, they
prefer to retrieve from memory information that confirms a presented hy-
pothesis or belief.146  For instance, participants in one study heard a story
about a woman who exhibited introverted and extroverted behaviors.147  Re-
searchers later asked half the participants to evaluate whether the woman
was suited for a job requiring extroversion and the other half to assess
whether she was suited for a job requiring introversion.148  The former group
recalled more examples of the woman’s extroversion, while the latter group
recalled more instances of her introversion.149  A focus on one hypothesis
(the woman’s suitability for one job versus the other) biased the participants,
causing them to search their memories for confirming evidence.150
Memory bias may distort not only how police and prosecutors recall
their investigative findings, but also the accounts of eyewitnesses on whom
investigators rely.  In the world of confirmation bias, distortion begets dis-
tortion.  Once expectations, among other factors, have led us to conclude we
perceived one thing rather than another, it becomes more difficult to per-
ceive details that contradict the original perception.151  Our misconceptions
can be reinforced as we establish the initial interpretation of what we per-
ceived, and later when we try to remember what we perceived.152
Of course, people do not always and inevitably see what they want to
see, or what they are told to see.  Confirmation bias is produced by the “cyc-
lical interplay between pre-existing schemata and the uptake of new infor-
mation.”153  Just as schemata, or mental categories constructed from
experience and belief, organize perception and inference so that we are able
to process new information, they also limit meaningful perception through
the selective processing of this new information.154  The human cognitive
system engages in this selective attention to information “so automatically
and seamlessly that we rarely realize we are doing it.”155
Researchers have specifically found that police investigators are “prone
to confirmation bias.”156  In one study, experienced investigators considered
witnesses who exonerated a favored suspect less credible than those who
145 See generally id.
146 Findley & Scott, supra note 11, at 312. R
147 THOMAS GILOVICH, HOW WE KNOW WHAT ISN’T SO: THE FALLIBILITY OF HUMAN REA-
SON IN EVERYDAY LIFE 33, 36 (1991).
148 Id. at 36.
149 Id.
150 See id.
151 Risinger et al., supra note 139, at 15. R
152 Id.
153 Id. at 13.
154 Id. at 13–15.
155 Id. at 15.
156 O’Brien, supra note 123, at 318. R
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incriminated that suspect.157  Similarly, in another study, police trainees con-
sidered evidence in a mock homicide case less reliable if it invalidated their
initial hypotheses.158
Professors Findley and Scott argue that confirmation bias helps explain
how state actors have failed in many wrongful conviction cases.  They de-
scribe the process as follows:
Convinced by an early — although plainly flawed — eyewitness
identification, police and prosecutors . . . sought evidence that
would confirm guilt, not disconfirm it.  They searched for incrimi-
nating evidence against their suspects, but never looked at viable
alternative perpetrators.  When confronted with ambiguous or in-
herently weak evidence . . .[,] police and prosecutors interpreted it
as powerfully incriminating.  When confronted with contrary evi-
dence . . .[,] they sought to discredit or minimize that evidence.159
The “stubborn assessment of guilt in these cases persisted on appeal and
through postconviction proceedings,” giving state actors a skewed sense of
the strength of their case and motivating them to persist against the wrong-
fully convicted defendant.160  Thus, that moment in every case when the “in-
vestigation shifts from figuring out what happened to proving” a favored
theory is when the truth-finding process becomes profoundly
compromised.161
2. Hindsight Bias.
Tunnel vision is further reinforced by cognitive distortions in the form
of hindsight bias.  According to cognitive researchers, hindsight bias is the
tendency to reanalyze an event until one’s memory of it makes the ultimate
conclusion about the event seem inevitable, more likely, or more predictable
than originally expected.  This cognitive distortion reflects the nature of
memory as a dynamic process of reconstruction, according to which little
pieces of information about an event or situation are constantly updated and
replaced in our brains by new information.  “During this process, evidence
consistent with the reported outcome is elaborated, and evidence inconsis-
tent with the outcome is minimized or discounted.  The result of this rejudg-
ment process is that the given outcome seems inevitable or, at least, more
plausible than alternative outcomes.”162
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Findley & Scott, supra note 11, at 316. R
160 Id.
161 O’Brien, supra note 123, at 316. R
162 Erin M. Harley, Keri A. Carlsen & Geoffrey R. Loftus, The “Saw-It-All-Along” Effect:
Demonstrations of Visual Hindsight Bias, 30 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY
& COGNITION 960, 960 (2004).
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Professors Findley and Scott have identified three potential dangers of
hindsight bias in the wrongful conviction context.  First, it could reinforce
unwarranted focus on an innocent suspect.  Once police or prosecutors deter-
mine who they believe is guilty, as a result of hindsight bias, “not only
might they overestimate the degree to which that suspect appeared guilty
from the beginning, but they will likely best remember those facts that are
incriminating (thereby reinforcing their commitment to focus on that person
as the culprit).”163
Second, hindsight bias may contribute to eyewitness identification er-
rors, which are the most common cause of wrongful convictions.164  Eyewit-
ness confidence is widely recognized to be quite malleable.165  Accordingly,
an eyewitness who receives “confirming feedback” after making an identifi-
cation can develop inflated “confidence in the ultimate identification . . .
[and in her] assessment of the conditions surrounding the identification.”166
For instance, in hindsight, an eyewitness who had a poor view of the perpe-
trator or paid little attention to the incident can start to believe the opposite
and reconstruct memories of the incident as clear.167
Third, hindsight bias has been associated with a “reiteration effect” that
exacerbates errors in criminal investigation and prosecution.168  Research has
shown that confidence in the truth of an assertion increases if the assertion is
repeated, even if the assertion is untrue.  Accordingly, the longer police,
prosecutors, and witnesses live with a conclusion of guilt and repeat that
conclusion and its bases, the more obvious it appears that all evidence
pointed to that conclusion from the start.  “[T]he reiteration effect makes it
increasingly difficult for police and prosecutors to consider alternative per-
petrators or theories of a crime.”169
3. Systemic Factors Trigger and Exacerbate Cognitive Distortions.
Professors Findley and Scott argue that multiple external forces, includ-
ing institutional pressures and training (or lack thereof), exacerbate law en-
forcement’s natural cognitive biases and cause tunnel vision.170  In addition
163 Findley & Scott, supra note 11, at 318. R
164 Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld, and Jim Dwyer determined that eyewitness misidentifica-
tions contributed to the initial convictions in over 80% of documented DNA exonerations.
SCHECK ET AL., supra note 18, at 246; see also Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the R
United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 542 (2005) (finding
eyewitness error in 64% of the 340 wrongful conviction cases studied).
165 Amy L. Bradfield, Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, The Damaging Effect of Con-
firming Feedback on the Relation Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy,
87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 112, 113 (2002).
166 Findley & Scott, supra note 11, at 318. R
167 Id. at 318–19.
168 Ralph Hertwig, Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage, The Reiteration Effect in Hind-
sight Bias, 104 PSYCHOL. REV. 194, 194 (1997).
169 Findley & Scott, supra note 11, at 319. R
170 Id. at 323, 327.
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to raising awareness of the occurrence and dangers of cognitive biases
among state employees, state officials have an obligation to address the sys-
temic factors that encourage these biases.
(a) Institutional Pressures Cause Cognitive Bias.
Researchers have found that calling upon a person to adopt a particular
function or perspective (i.e., a “role”) has cognitive effects.  In one study,
participants who assumed the role of homebuyer recalled the details of a
story about a house differently than those who assumed the role of burglar.171
Accordingly, “investigators whose role is to solve a problem may become
convinced of the truth of a proposed solution more easily than investigators
whose role is to describe a situation, or to describe the likelihood of various
options.”172
Police officers face pressures from various sources, including supervi-
sors, victims, the community, and the media, to solve crimes quickly.173  Me-
dia and the public subject the police to unrealistic expectations about their
capacity to solve crimes.174  Large caseloads place the police under constant
pressure to complete assigned cases and move on.175  The clearance rate, or
rate at which cases reported to the police are closed, is the most common
measure of investigator performance.176  Police administrators have been
known to pressure investigators to make sure the case clearance rates ulti-
mately reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and the pub-
lic do not diminish public confidence in the police.177  Thus, “investigators’
thought processes may become distorted by the desire to alleviate the pres-
sure that comes from not being able to assure the public that the offender has
been caught and the community is safe.”178  Moreover, according to FBI
rules, arresting an offender and turning over the case file to prosecutors is
enough to clear a case, potentially leading investigators to conclude that
their responsibility begins and ends with arresting a “plausible offender.”179
Prosecutors also face tunnel-vision-inducing pressures to ensure con-
viction of the suspects apprehended by police.  Role effects are distorting for
prosecutors much like they are for the police:
171 Risinger et al., supra note 139, at 18. R
172 Id. at 19.
173 Findley & Scott, supra note 11, at 323; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS R
& EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 227–28 (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds.,
2004).
174 See Kenneth Dowler, Media Consumption and Public Attitudes Toward Crime and
Justice: The Relationship Between Fear of Crime, Punitive Attitudes, and Perceived Police
Effectiveness, 10 J. CRIM. JUST. & POPULAR CULTURE 109, 111 (2003).
175 Findley & Scott, supra note 11, at 325. R
176 Id.
177 Id. at 324.
178 Id. at 323.
179 Id. at 325–26.
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In those rare cases where a defendant is acquitted, the conclusion
that ethical prosecutors, convinced that they would only prosecute
a guilty person, must reach is not that the defendant was truly in-
nocent, but that the system failed, that the truth did not prevail,
that justice miscarried.180
Prosecutors’ offices often emphasize conviction rates in evaluating job per-
formance and justifying their work.181  In combination with public pressure,
this focus on conviction rates fosters a “conviction psychology,” which di-
minishes the value of doing justice.182  Even those prosecutors most commit-
ted to justice — the “ethical and honorable” prosecutors — need to believe
their role is “righteous[ ],” rather than harmful to blameless defendants.183
Empirical data showing that greater prosecutorial experience correlates with
a stronger conviction-oriented mentality reflects the psychological power of
such institutional and cultural pressures in prosecutors’ offices.184
Cognitively biased police investigations further distort prosecutorial as-
sessments.  While prosecutors see the evidence generated by the police in-
vestigation, often they “do not see the evidence about alternative suspects
who were rejected too quickly, about eyewitnesses who failed to identify the
defendant, or about other disconfirming evidence that police dismissed as
insignificant.”185  Moreover, prosecutors rarely receive feedback challenging
these assessments of guilt because most criminal defendants plead guilty and
most trials result in convictions.186
Finally, research has revealed “conformity effects,” or the human ten-
dency to rely on others’ views to develop our own conclusions.187  People
may rely on others to gain additional information, or “merely to be in step
with their peers.”188  Difference in rank can exacerbate these effects, as re-
search reveals that individuals of lower rank are more influenced by those of
perceived higher rank than the reverse.189  Thus, as police investigators and
prosecutors collaborate on a case, the cognitive biases of one team member
may unduly distort the thinking of another.
Entrenched role assignments, hierarchies, and group dynamics within
police departments and prosecutors’ offices are inarguably challenging to
180 Burke, supra note 30, at 519–20. R
181 Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 134–35 (2004); George T. Felkenes, The Prosecu-
tor: A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98, 99, 114 (1975).
182 See Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework,
15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 198 (1988); Felkenes, supra note 181, at 108–12. R
183 Findley & Scott, supra note 11, at 329; Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor’s R
Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 551 (1997).
184 Felkenes, supra note 181, at 111. R
185 Findley & Scott, supra note 11, at 330. R
186 See Burke, supra note 30, at 519. R
187 Risinger et al., supra note 139, at 19. R
188 Id.
189 See id.
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transform.  However, as discussed below,190 this Article proposes that crimi-
nal justice systems can go a long way in developing awareness of the dan-
gers of cognitive bias and encouraging state actors to challenge their own, as
well as their colleagues’, initial views of a criminal case.
(b) Traditional Law Enforcement Training Promotes Techniques
That Foster Cognitive Bias.
Making matters worse, “[t]o a surprisingly large extent, tunnel vision
in the criminal justice system exists not despite our best efforts to overcome
these cognitive biases and institutional pressures, but because of our deliber-
ate systemic choices.”191  Traditional law enforcement training lacks instruc-
tion on recognizing and overcoming tunnel vision, and also “affirmatively
teaches” investigators to use techniques that result in “encouraged tunnel
vision.”192
For instance, most police officers in the United States are taught that
“interrogations” should elicit confessions rather than information, and there-
fore to use interrogations to prejudge guilt rather than to consider alterna-
tives.193  The most commonly taught interrogation technique, the “Reid
Technique,” generally includes the following: (1) isolating the suspect; (2)
confronting her with assertions of guilt; (3) interrupting any denials of guilt;
(4) convincing the suspect police have evidence of her guilt; and (5) offering
sympathy and minimizing the moral seriousness of the act to make the sus-
pect believe confessing is her best option.194  Police typically engage in such
interrogations when they lack sufficient other evidence of guilt.195  However,
instead of encouraging police to maintain an open mind at this stage, law
enforcement training openly encourages cognitive biases, “expressly em-
brac[ing] the foundational problems with tunnel vision — a premature con-
clusion of guilt, and an unwillingness to consider alternatives.”196
Police manuals also encourage ineffective methods of identifying de-
ception during an interrogation, including reliance on indicators such as gaze
aversion, unnatural posture, physical self-manipulation, and the covering of
mouth or eyes.197  Research shows that most police officers rely on such
190 See infra section II.B.
191 Findley & Scott, supra note 11, at 333. R
192 Id.
193 Id. at 334.
194 See Richard A. Leo, The Third Degree and the Origins of Psychological Interrogation
in the United States, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 37, 72–73 (G.
Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004); Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions, 60 AM.
PSYCHOL. 215, 220 (2005); Saul M. Kassin, Christine C. Goldstein & Kenneth Savitsky, Be-
havioral Confirmation in the Interrogation Room: On the Dangers of Presuming Guilt, 27
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 187, 188 (2003).
195 Findley & Scott, supra note 11, at 335–36. R
196 Id. at 335.
197 FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 143–53 (2001);
Samantha Mann, Aldert Vrij & Ray Bull, Detecting True Lies: Police Officers’ Ability to De-
tect Suspects’ Lies, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 137, 144 (2004).
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cues,198 even though the cues do not actually prove fabrication.199  Accord-
ingly, trained investigators tend to be overconfident in their ability to iden-
tify deception200 and err by accepting false confessions.201
B. Neutralizing Cognitive Bias
Empirical evidence has shown that cognitive bias can be neutralized,
offering governments a tremendous opportunity to reduce the likelihood of
wrongful convictions and making it incumbent upon them to implement
practices in an effort to do so.  Acknowledging the science and attendant
state duties opens the door to framing malicious prosecution claims not just
against state actors relatively low on the totem pole, like investigators, but
also against municipalities and key policymakers who fail to implement rea-
sonable practices that neutralize cognitive bias.  Such claims could result in
injunctive relief, including systemic reforms to neutralize cognitive bias.
Cognitive scientists have found that educating individuals about the
cognitive processes leading to bias can mitigate bias, though likely not elim-
inate it entirely.202  In a recent Canadian study simulating the investigation of
an industrial incident, researchers educated study participants — students
and professional investigators — about tunnel vision, informing them how it
can bias information collection, interpretation, and decisionmaking, provid-
ing concrete examples of confirmation bias, encouraging them to consider
alternative hypotheses when investigating, and providing an example of poor
decisionmaking because of failure to consider alternative hypotheses.203  The
researchers found that education had some debiasing effect on their study
participants, and caused participants to seek a greater amount of information
about what caused the industrial incident than those in the control
condition.204
Ensuring that police and prosecutors consider a range of views can fur-
ther protect against tunnel vision.  Researchers have found that “induced
counter-argument” — requiring people to articulate arguments that contra-
198 See Mann et al., supra note 197, at 142, 144. R
199 See id. at 144; AMINA MEMON, ALDERT VRIJ & RAY BULL, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW:
TRUTHFULNESS, ACCURACY AND CREDIBILITY 30–31 (2d ed. 2003) (describing a review of over
100 studies revealing that “a typical nonverbal response during deception does not exist”); see
generally Bella M. DePaulo et al., Cues to Deception, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 74 (2003).
200 See Kassin et al., supra note 194, at 189; Christian A. Meissner & Saul M. Kassin, R
“He’s Guilty!”: Investigator Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception, 26 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 469, 478 (2002).
201 See Saul M. Kassin, Christian A. Meissner & Rebecca J. Norwick, “I’d Know a False
Confession if I Saw One”: A Comparative Study of College Students and Police Investigators,
29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 211, 222 (2005).
202 See Burke, supra note 30, at 522–23; see also Findley & Scott, supra note 11, at R
370–71.
203 Carla L. MacLean, C.A. Elizabeth Brimacombe & D. Stephen Lindsay, Investigating
Industrial Investigation: Examining the Impact of A Priori Knowledge and Tunnel Vision Edu-
cation, 37 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 441, 442–43 (2013).
204 See id. at 448.
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dict their existing beliefs — and “exposure to opposing views can reverse
the effects of cognitive bias.”205  “Considering alternatives breaks the inertia
that comes from focusing on data consistent with an initial hypothesis. . . .
[and] may activate a mind-set that reduces bias in later, unrelated judgment
tasks.”206  Accordingly, in one study, participants who were asked to select a
suspect and then to discuss evidence both for and against that hypothesis
showed no more bias than people who stated no hypothesis at all.207  Yet
considering several suspects, instead of just one, left participants as biased as
those considering only evidence favoring one suspect.208  Thus, while
“[i]nvestigators cannot always delay focusing on a suspect, [ ] taking the
extra step of actively considering evidence that points away from that sus-
pect shows promise as a simple way to counteract bias.”209
Professor Alafair Burke argues in the prosecutorial context that sys-
temic reform of law enforcement practices should couple education with
training on such debiasing strategies.210  She proposes that prosecutors serve
as their own devil’s advocates, establish internal review processes at their
offices, and expose prosecutorial decisionmaking to external review.211  Sim-
ilar techniques have been used by intelligence agencies to “address
problems of narrow analysis”212 and could assist police departments as well.
More specifically, Professor Burke suggests that, to neutralize their
own biases, prosecutors should regularly review cases from the perspective
of defense counsel in search of reasonable doubt.213  Instead of “accept[ing]
evidence that appears inculpatory[, they] should force [themselves] to artic-
ulate any basis for skepticism.”214  “Similarly, rather than assuming that
seemingly exculpatory evidence is flawed, they should probe the value of
that evidence to the defense.”215  Professor Burke believes disciplined
counterargument is particularly useful for counteracting prosecutors’ persis-
tent belief in a defendant’s guilt even after exoneration.216  Indeed, this sim-
ple technique, which has the virtue of advancing good, basic lawyering
skills, also has the potential to mitigate the reiteration effect that threatens
pending criminal investigations and prosecutions.217
205 Burke, supra note 30, at 523. R
206 O’Brien, supra note 123, at 317. R
207 Id. at 329.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 See Burke, supra note 30, at 523–28. R
211 Id.
212 Colin Wastell et al., Identifying Hypothesis Confirmation Behaviors in a Simulated
Murder Investigation: Implications for Practice, 9 J. INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOL. & OFFENDER
PROFILING 184, 196 (2012).
213 See id.; Burke, supra note 30, at 524. R
214 Burke, supra note 30, at 524–25. R
215 Id. at 525.
216 Id.
217 See supra notes 168–169 and accompanying text regarding the “reiteration effect.” R
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Taking Professor Burke’s proposal to its logical (albeit more revolution-
ary) conclusion, prosecutors and defense attorneys might acknowledge their
common goal to prevent wrongful convictions and communicate to that end.
An internal review process could provide an additional debiasing mech-
anism.  Professor Burke proposes tasking more neutral prosecutors (unasso-
ciated with initial charging decisions) with taking a “fresh look” at cases,
particularly where the government’s original evidence against a defendant
has been undermined.218  Offices with adequate resources could formalize
such reviews, while less resourced offices could encourage informal debate
to mitigate cognitive bias.219  Such practices would send a strong message
that the ideal prosecutorial role transcends securing convictions and that
conformity is not desirable among colleagues working to secure justice.
Finally, an external review process might be more effective than inter-
nal review in overcoming conformity effects.  External review may be ac-
complished by making prosecutorial decisions more transparent, or by
designating outside reviewers.220  Professors Angela Davis and Daniel
Medwed have suggested increasing transparency with the creation of
prosecutorial public information offices that would disclose prosecutorial
policies.221  Although prosecutors are likely to resist formal outside review
that would impose on their broad discretion, Professor Burke suggests re-
view committees that would serve in only an advisory fashion over limited
factual questions.222
Even training law enforcement personnel on proper interviewing skills
could reduce the impact of confirmation bias.  Research has clearly estab-
lished the relationship between poor interviewing and confirmation bias.223
As bias manifests through questions that include or presume details not men-
tioned by the interviewee, the risk of false witness testimony escalates.224  A
recent Australian study concluded that “even if confirmation bias occurs au-
tomatically when interviewers receive knowledge about a case, they are able
to overcome this bias if they had been previously trained to adhere to best
practice guidelines and ask open questions.”225
Because set conclusions about guilt are so difficult to overcome,
Professors Findley and Scott argue that the focus must be on “helping po-
lice, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges understand why it is important
218 Burke, supra note 30, at 525–26. R
219 Id. at 526.
220 Id. at 527.
221 See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat
of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 461–62 (2001); Medwed, supra note 181, at 177–78. R
222 Burke, supra note 30, at 527. R
223 Martine B. Powell et al., Skill in Interviewing Reduces Confirmation Bias, 9 J. INVESTI-
GATIVE PSYCHOL. & OFFENDER PROFILING 126, 126 (2012).
224 Id.
225 Id. at 131.
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to suspend judgment as long as possible, and to resist the impulse to develop
conclusions about a case too soon.”226
As elaborated below, governments should be held accountable for fail-
ing to mitigate cognitive bias by training employees to suspend judgment
and challenge their own hypotheses, and by implementing review processes
that help employees generate alternative viewpoints.
III. OBJECTIVELY UNREASONABLE COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS
IN THE WONG CASE
Tunnel vision, created and compounded by systemic forces, kept Wong
behind bars long after he should have been given his freedom.  And tunnel
vision also helps explain why so many state actors clung to the objectively
unreasonable position that Wong was guilty.  The following analysis models
applying the reasonableness standard through a cognitive bias lens to the
individual state defendants in Wong’s case.
A. Prison Yard Tower Guard Richard F. LaPierre
Correction Officer Richard F. LaPierre was posted to a tower in the
prison yard of Clinton Correctional Facility when someone fatally stabbed
inmate Tyrone Julius there.227  LaPierre identified Wong as the perpetrator,
causing other prison officers to detain and strip-search Wong immediately
upon his exit from the prison yard.228  LaPierre’s identification set in motion
a process that led directly to Wong’s prosecution and conviction.229
Meanwhile, a number of factors made LaPierre’s identification of
Wong, and the reliance on and perpetuation of that identification, objectively
unreasonable.  First, prison yard conditions prevented LaPierre from seeing
the perpetrator.  Not only was LaPierre posted to a yard tower about 400 feet
away from the crime scene,230 but also the incident was obstructed by nearly
700 similarly clad inmates forming lines to exit the yard.231  Making matters
worse, from his faraway perch, LaPierre multitasked and, at times, used the
naked eye.  In fact, LaPierre allegedly witnessed the incident with the naked
eye, before picking up his binoculars to follow the perpetrator along a con-
voluted route, as the perpetrator crossed the yard and communicated with
other inmates.232  Reinforcing the objective unreasonableness of his identifi-
cation and other state actors’ reliance on it, LaPierre was the only correction
226 Findley & Scott, supra note 11, at 372. R
227 Wong v. LaPierre, No. 8:07-CV-1110, slip op. at 3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2011) (order
granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment).
228 Id. at 4–5; Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Opposition, supra note 9, at 2. R
229 Wong, No. 8:07-CV-1110, slip op. at 5–14; Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Opposition,
supra note 9, at 4. R
230 Wong, No. 8:07-CV-1110, slip op. at 3–4.
231 See id. at 3; Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Opposition, supra note 9, at 4. R
232 See Wong, No. 8:07-CV-1110, slip op. at 4–5.
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officer to report witnessing the stabbing, even though there were guards
posted in substantially closer proximity to the incident.233
Second, there was no physical evidence connecting Wong to the mur-
der.234  Although Wong was strip-searched immediately upon exiting the
yard at LaPierre’s prompting, prison officers found no weapon on him or
anywhere else.235  Wong was carrying only an “Oriental newspaper,” which
LaPierre later admitted he did not see on the assailant.236  Moreover, officers
found no trace of blood anywhere on Wong, even though Julius’s stab wound
“spurted” blood and “created a sufficient amount of blood to have splattered
over the perpetrator.”237
Despite the profound flaws of LaPierre’s identification, he became the
complaining witness against Wong.  He provided his identification to the
New York State Bureau of Criminal Investigation and incriminated Wong in
direct conversations with the District Attorney’s Office and through his testi-
mony at the grand jury and criminal trial proceedings.238
Under the highly fact-specific objective reasonableness analysis, a jury
could easily conclude that LaPierre was culpable for Wong’s wrongful con-
viction based on direct evidence.  In contrast, a finding of liability under the
erroneous malicious intent standard would require inferential reasoning.
That is, because direct evidence of LaPierre’s mental state (or, for that mat-
ter, mental state generally) does not exist, a finder of fact would have to
infer LaPierre’s mental state from circumstantial evidence.
Notwithstanding the benefit of direct evidence, a challenge for a lawyer
trying this case under the objective reasonableness standard would be to help
the jury understand LaPierre’s unreasonable conduct without resorting to
motive.  Cognitive psychology offers an explanation that lawyers can em-
ploy with the assistance of experts.
A cognitive psychologist evaluating the evidence in the Wong case and
employing the concepts described above could conclude that, at some point
while LaPierre attempted to follow the perpetrator with his binoculars, Wong
may have entered LaPierre’s line of vision.  Falling victim to confirmation
and hindsight bias, LaPierre then unwittingly began to reconstruct his mem-
ory of what he had done and seen beforehand as consistent with keeping his
eyes on Wong the entire time (from the time of the assault until fellow
guards apprehended Wong on the other side of the prison yard, at LaPierre’s
prompting).  In the process, LaPierre would have ignored or undervalued
highly inconsistent information, including: (1) that the perpetrator was not
carrying a newspaper, but Wong was; (2) that LaPierre was not using binoc-
233 Id. at 5.
234 Id. at 16.
235 Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Opposition, supra note 9, at 2. R
236 Id.
237 Id. (citing New York v. Wong, 11 A.D.3d 724, 726 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (reversing
Wong’s conviction)).
238 Wong, No. 8:07-CV-1110, slip op. at 15.
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ulars the entire time and so the actual perpetrator likely escaped his view; (3)
that LaPierre’s view was obstructed by nearly 700 similarly clad inmates in
motion; and (4) that LaPierre’s view of the stabbing itself was compromised
by 400 feet (more than the length of a football field) of distance.  Moreover,
in the months following the incident and leading up to the criminal trial,
LaPierre would have had to ignore or undervalue substantial exculpatory
evidence — including the complete absence of blood on Wong even though
the victim’s wound would have splattered, and the eyewitness testimony of
other inmates described below.
LaPierre’s role as prison yard tower guard may have encouraged tunnel
vision in the face of uncertainty, making the parameters of his role and the
institutional pressures on him important sources of explanation for his objec-
tively unreasonable conduct.  Presumably, the institution depended on La-
Pierre to prevent security breaches in the prison yard, to identify culprits
when breaches occurred, and generally to help maintain the impression that
prison administrators were in control.  Indeed, it is highly unlikely that La-
Pierre was called upon to keep an open mind.  A lawyer trying this case
would do well to gather evidence about LaPierre’s job description, his super-
visors’ expectations, bases for his performance evaluations, the training he
received, and other sources of systemic influences.
Further, cognitive psychology teaches that once LaPierre concluded
that Wong was the perpetrator and reconstructed his memory accordingly, it
became even more difficult for him to perceive details that contradicted that
conclusion.  As a result, he continued to hold fast to the identification — to
testify against Wong time and again — and to encourage his colleagues to
promote and reinforce the false identification.  At the same time, his col-
leagues’ reinforcement of the identification may have given him inflated
confidence in the identification and in his poor assessment of the surround-
ing conditions.  Using cognitive psychology, an expert could explain to a
jury LaPierre’s perpetual denial of wrongdoing.239
B. Prison Guard Joseph Wood
On the day of the stabbing, Lieutenant Joseph Wood was the Watch
Commander, responsible for all security staff and facility operations at Clin-
ton.240  While still receiving reports about the incident on a rolling basis from
sergeants and correction officers, including LaPierre, Wood reported to the
Department of Corrections Central Office that Wong was “involved” in the
239 In addition to confirmation bias and hindsight bias, stereotyping may have influenced
LaPierre’s false identification.  Wong was one of only two Chinese inmates at Clinton Correc-
tional Facility, and therefore may have met LaPierre’s stereotyped expectations of who the
perpetrator would be.  Whether this is a question of unconscious racism or perhaps Wong’s
greater visibility as “other,” it would be another avenue to explore for explaining LaPierre’s
behavior from a cognitive perspective.
240 Wong, No. 8:07-CV-1110, slip op. at 3.
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crime.241  Indeed, within just hours of the stabbing, and well before the Bu-
reau of Criminal Investigation had a chance to complete its month-long in-
vestigation, Wood put an end to the in-house prison investigation he directed
by completing a report formally accusing Wong of the crime.242
Wood was quick to endorse LaPierre’s identification of Wong, despite
an abundance of information that objectively should have given him pause.
Through reports and his general knowledge as Watch Commander, Wood
should have known that the conditions of the prison yard, as well as La-
Pierre’s sporadic use of binoculars, made it virtually impossible for LaPierre
to see the incident and accurately follow the perpetrator all the way across
the yard.
Besides disregarding evidence that undermined LaPierre’s identifica-
tion, Wood failed to conduct an investigation thorough enough to uncover
exculpatory information from inmates who witnessed the incident.243
Rather, without much vetting, Wood accepted inmate Peter Dellfava’s claim
that Wong committed the crime.244  There was, in fact, good reason to ques-
tion Dellfava’s statement, including that it was inconsistent with the exculpa-
tory statements of numerous other inmates who identified a Latino
perpetrator, and that Dellfava provided the statement in exchange for a trans-
fer to a prison near his home.245  Indeed, years later, Dellfava recanted and
attributed his false, inculpatory statement to coercion by Sergeant Roger
Nelson.246  On the day of the incident, Nelson reported to Wood, and notified
Wood about interviewing Dellfava.247  By all accounts, however, neither
Wood nor the Bureau of Criminal Investigation ever interviewed, or ob-
tained a report from, Nelson about his interactions with Dellfava.248
From a cognitive psychology perspective, arguably, Wood also fell vic-
tim to confirmation bias.  By adhering to one hypothesis — LaPierre’s iden-
tification of Wong as the perpetrator — Wood closed himself off to
alternatives and therefore disregarded information supportive of those alter-
natives.  He did so by undervaluing or ignoring evidence that weakened La-
Pierre’s identification and by conducting an investigation so limited that
exculpatory evidence could not surface.  Accordingly, he had no need to
assess carefully inmate Dellfava’s inculpatory statement because it was con-
sistent with the expectation set by LaPierre’s identification.
241 Id. at 5–6.
242 Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Opposition, supra note 9, at 6. R
243 Id. at 7.
244 See id. at 5–6.
245 Id. at 7.
246 Wong, No. 8:07-CV-1110, slip op. at 10 n.4, 17–18.
247 Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Opposition, supra note 9, at 6. R
248 See id. (“[Nelson] also claims he prepared a report of the interview [with Dellfava]
and submitted it through the standard channels, but defendants concede no such report has
surfaced in discovery . . . . [Moreover,] Nelson is not mentioned in the BCI investigation
report . . . .”)
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The pressures Wood faced in his role as the prison security leader at the
time of Julius’s murder may have prompted him to jump to a conclusion
rather than to spend time assessing various options.  Accordingly, a lawyer
litigating this case might pursue evidence of such pressures, including addi-
tional information about Wood’s position, the frequency of prison yard as-
saults on his watch (solved and unsolved), the bases of his job evaluations,
and the training he received.
Wood’s serious and objectively unreasonable oversights were made
more egregious by the exculpatory evidence unearthed during the investiga-
tion that the New York State Bureau of Criminal Investigation (“BCI”)
conducted.
C. BCI Investigator Thomas Hickey
Thomas Hickey, a lead BCI investigator, arrived at Clinton about an
hour after the incident, and immediately conferred with Wood.249  Hickey
and other BCI investigators proceeded to interview numerous correction of-
ficers and inmates and to generate a report.250  The report began with an
uncritical account of LaPierre’s identification of Wong as the assailant.251
This is, perhaps, no surprise, as the first thing Hickey must have learned
upon arriving at the prison is that officials had already identified Wong as
the perpetrator.  That Wood, as head of prison security, endorsed this conclu-
sion may well have had a conformity effect on Hickey.  Accordingly, by all
indications, Hickey’s investigation became the pursuit of evidence to con-
firm Wong’s guilt.
Hickey included in his investigation report various inmate statements.
One was the inculpatory statement of inmate Dellfava, who had allegedly
come forward to Sergeant Roger Nelson as a witness.252  Even though the
circumstances of this inmate’s disclosure were highly suspect, particularly
with respect to Nelson’s role, Hickey never questioned Nelson.253  From a
cognitive psychology perspective, Hickey’s commitment to the premise that
Wong killed Julius led him to filter all evidence accordingly, such that he did
not question confirming evidence like Dellfava’s statement.
Hickey’s report also included the exculpatory statements of numerous
inmates, who collectively explained why Wong could not have committed
the stabbing and described the perpetrator as Latino.254  One inmate specifi-
cally identified Nelson Gutierrez as the assailant, but it took Hickey over a
month to interview Gutierrez, and at no point did Hickey treat Gutierrez like
249 Wong, No. 8:07-CV-1110, slip op. at 6.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 7.
252 Id. at 9–10.
253 Id. at 10 n.4.
254 Id. at 8–9, 11–13.
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a suspect.255  This provides yet another example of Hickey discounting or
disregarding evidence inconsistent with his driving hypothesis.  Hickey per-
sisted in this manner, even though he could find no physical evidence or
motive linking Wong to the crime.256  And as he promoted Wong’s guilt, the
reiteration effect made it more difficult for him to see other perpetrators and
crime theories as real possibilities.
Using Hickey’s report and ongoing assistance, as well as the testimony
of LaPierre, Dellfava, and other correction officers, the Clinton County Dis-
trict Attorney proceeded to prosecute Wong for first-degree murder — even
as additional exculpatory evidence surfaced.257  Hickey helped prepare the
government’s case and sat at counsel’s table during the trial. 258  On August
24, 1987, Wong was sentenced to a term of twenty-five years to life in
prison for the murder of Tyrone Julius.259  It appears prosecutors fell under
the spell of cognitive bias as well.
As Wong’s case illustrates, wrongful conviction can be caused by a se-
ries of objectively unreasonable actions, none of which necessarily reflects
malice or produces evidence of malice.  Wong’s story is replete with evi-
dence of unintentional tunnel vision, including LaPierre’s zealous commit-
ment to his identification of Wong, despite compelling evidence that he
could not have seen Wong stab Julius, let alone follow Wong with his eyes
through the prison yard; Wood’s immediate adoption of LaPierre’s identifica-
tion and resulting failure to complete his internal investigation; and Hickey’s
active role in prosecuting Wong, despite continually emerging exculpatory
evidence.  Making objectively unreasonable cognitive biases a basis for
§ 1983 claims of unreasonable prosecution can motivate law enforcement to
compensate for, and thus deter, these biases.  And to accomplish such an
outcome, the doctrinal approach of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits must
prevail.
IV. CLAIMS AGAINST LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, INFORMED BY COGNITIVE
SCIENCE, CAN PROPEL REFORM OF MUNICIPAL POLICIES AND
PRACTICES THAT CAUSE WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
Wong did not bring any § 1983 claims against the local government for
his wrongful conviction.  However, a shift in the law — away from malice
and toward objective reasonableness through a cognitive bias lens — would
open the door to § 1983 claims against municipalities for failing to train and
supervise their police officers and prosecutors to recognize and neutralize
cognitive bias.  Claims against municipalities can lead to systemic reform
through individual actions for damages, as well as class actions for injunc-
255 Id. at 9, 11.
256 Id. at 19.
257 See id. at 12–16.
258 Id. at 15.
259 See id. at 15–16.
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tive relief.  Municipalities make particularly attractive targets for damages
relief because, unlike individual state defendants, they are barred from rais-
ing a qualified immunity defense.260 Moreover, municipalities’ capacity to
provide injunctive relief arguably offers civil rights plaintiffs a less tenuous
avenue for attacking cognitive bias in the criminal justice system than dam-
ages actions alone.261
In the landmark decision of Monell v. Department of Social Services,262
the Supreme Court determined that, although municipalities and other local
governments cannot be sued under § 1983 for the acts of their employees,
they may be sued for official policies or customs that cause constitutional
torts.263  The existence of a policy sufficient to impose § 1983 liability on a
government can be established through: (1) decisions of municipal
lawmakers; (2) actions of policymaking officials; and (3) “practices so per-
sistent and widespread as practically to have the force of law.”264
The Supreme Court held in City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris265 that “the
inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only
where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of
persons with whom the police come into contact.”266  A municipality is de-
260 Owens v. Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980) (holding that a municipality sued
under Monell for violations committed by its officials does not have a qualified immunity from
damages liability under § 1983, even if it could show that the officials would be entitled to
such an immunity in a suit against them in their individual capacities).
261 Individual damages actions are essential to compensating injured plaintiffs and, argua-
bly, to educating judges about government misconduct so that they might be more effective in
addressing structural reform through future cases.  James J. Park, The Constitutional Tort Ac-
tion as Individual Remedy, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 451–52 (2003).  Further, the
Supreme Court considers it “almost axiomatic” that civil rights damages actions deter govern-
ment employees and policymakers. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980).  Various
distinguished scholars have concurred. See generally, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J.
Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731
(1991); Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845 (2001); Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical
Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913 (2007).
However, other distinguished scholars have offered theories about why civil rights damages
actions will not effectively deter police department officials from engaging in future unconsti-
tutional behavior. See generally, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REME-
DIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS (1983); Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police
Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453 (2004); Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay:
Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000).
Early empirical work suggests that the deterrence effect of damages suits depends on the qual-
ity of law enforcement agencies’ systems for gathering and analyzing data about lawsuits.
Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law En-
forcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1028–29 (2010) (finding that few police
departments gather and analyze lawsuits brought against them and their officers, and contrast-
ing department practices with theories of deterrence).  Thus, injunctive relief must play a criti-
cal role in achieving structural reform.
262 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
263 Id. at 690–91, 694.
264 Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 34, § 8.5.2. R
265 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
266 Id. at 388.
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liberately indifferent when it fails to provide adequate training although the
need for training is obvious and the inadequacy likely to result in the viola-
tion of constitutional rights.267  Under such circumstances, “the failure to
provide proper training may fairly be said to represent a policy for which the
city is responsible.”268
Failing to train police officers in the use of firearms provides one exam-
ple of an unconstitutional municipal policy.269  The Supreme Court has said
that the need to train officers in the constitutional limitations on use of
deadly force is obvious because city policymakers “know to a moral cer-
tainty” that their police officers will be required to arrest fleeing felons and
cities provide their officers with firearms to facilitate this very task.270  Addi-
tionally, the police so often violate constitutional rights in exercising their
discretion in the use of firearms that the need for further training must be
obvious to city policymakers.271
Since Canton, numerous lower courts have found “deliberate indiffer-
ence” on similar grounds, including for failure to train police officers how to
deal with armed, suicidal, emotionally distressed persons, failure to train po-
lice officers in handling police dogs, failure to formulate a policy against
sexual harassment, and failure to protect a first-time offender placed in a cell
with a known violent rapist.272  Other lower courts have found deliberate
indifference where a municipality is on constructive notice of a pattern of
constitutional violations, such as when the city has received but failed to
respond to complaints of police abuse.273
Floyd v. City of New York,274 a recent high profile § 1983 class action
against the City of New York, showcases the promise of failure to train/
supervise claims for injunctive relief.  The plaintiffs, African Americans and
Latinos who were stopped by the New York Police Department (“NYPD”),
argued for reform of a City policy or custom of unconstitutional stops and
frisks.275  Judge Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York found that
NYPD supervisors routinely reviewed the productivity of officers without
considering the facts of a stop to determine whether it was legally warranted
or ensuring that officers were keeping records that would make such review
possible.276  The NYPD “repeatedly turned a blind eye to clear evidence of
unconstitutional stops and frisks” by hindering the collection of accurate
267 Id. at 390; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 34, § 8.5.2; Karen M. Blum, Making Out R
the Monell Claim under Section 1983, 25 TOURO L. REV. 829, 843 (2009).
268 Canton, 489 U.S. at 390.
269 Id. at 390 n.10.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 34, § 8.5.2. R
273 Id.; see also Blum, supra note 267, at 843. R
274 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
275 Id. at 556.
276 Id. at 561.
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data and making no effective use of the limited available data.277  Further-
more, despite mounting evidence of unconstitutional stops, officer training
remained deficient.278
Judge Scheindlin concluded that although the NYPD had been placed
on actual and constructive notice of the need for better supervision, monitor-
ing, training, and discipline to protect against constitutional violations, the
NYPD “fail[ed] to make meaningful efforts to address the risk of harm to
plaintiffs.”279  Additionally, the judge found sufficient evidence of unconsti-
tutional stops to warrant municipal liability based on “practices so persistent
and widespread as to practically have the force of law.”280  Following these
rulings against the City of New York, the Floyd lawsuit resulted in a trans-
formation of the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk practices.281
Given the cognitive science discussed above, similar theories should
allow civil rights plaintiffs to sue municipalities and other local governments
for their deliberate indifference in addressing the tunnel vision that causes
wrongful convictions.  Just as the City of New York in Floyd failed to train
its officers on proper stops and frisks, municipalities have failed to provide
police officers and prosecutors adequate training on recognizing and neutral-
izing cognitive bias despite the foreseeable serious consequences of objec-
tively unreasonable conduct resulting from cognitive bias.  The government’s
deliberate indifference could also be framed as a failure to respond to volu-
minous complaints of wrongful convictions over the years, particularly in
light of significant research attributing those convictions to cognitive bias.
The Floyd court found liability based on such willful blindness, implying
that municipalities have an obligation actively to educate themselves on the
dangers of their employees’ practices.  Accordingly, a civil rights plaintiff
could argue that the government failed to supervise its prosecutors and of-
ficers properly by neglecting to review investigations and prosecution deci-
sions, failing to encourage consideration of alternative theories, and
perpetuating and failing to address various institutional pressures that trigger
and exacerbate cognitive bias, including problematic performance measures
and interrogation techniques.
Numerous individual actions seeking damages from municipalities for
failing to train and supervise their employees provide similar support for a
claim based on failure to address the impact of cognitive bias on criminal
investigation and prosecution.282  Indeed, in a § 1983 case alleging municipal
277 Id. at 659.
278 Id.
279 Id. at 658–59 (alteration in original) (quoting Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 334
(2d Cir. 2011)).
280 Id. at 659–60 (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011)).
281 Mark Hamblett, Settlement Reached in NYC Stop-and-Frisk Civil Suit, N.Y. L.J. (Jan.
9, 2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202714435284/Settlement-Reached-in-
NYC-StopandFrisk-Civil-Suit, archived at http://perma.cc/2X5U-Z6JS.
282 See, e.g., Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 1992) (reversing
district court’s dismissal of claims alleging municipality’s failure to train and supervise officers
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\50-2\HLC204.txt unknown Seq: 42 23-JUL-15 14:09
400 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 50
liability based on inadequate training of police officers in the use of force,
the Tenth Circuit denied the city summary judgment:
[A] showing of specific incidents which establish a pattern of
constitutional violations is not necessary to put the City on notice
that its training program is inadequate.  Rather, evidence of a sin-
gle violation of federal rights, accompanied by a showing that a
municipality has failed to train its employees to handle recurring
situations presenting an obvious potential for such a violation, is
sufficient to trigger municipal liability.283
Thus, a plaintiff should not be required to prove the impact of cognitive bias
on wrongful convictions beyond her own, as long as she can also demon-
strate that the municipality has failed to train its employees in handling their
own cognitive biases.  Perhaps unfortunately, the latter should not pose an
obstacle to plaintiffs.
Such municipal claims would have entitled Wong to discovery about
the training and supervision received by prison guards and state investiga-
tors, the other wrongful convictions caused by the same municipality, and
institutional pressures such as performance measures that might have influ-
enced the defendants’ unreasonable decisionmaking.  With the aid of experts
in cognitive science, litigation could be used to assess whether a municipal-
ity took the steps necessary to address tunnel vision as a matter of policy.
Where municipal policies are flawed, a lawsuit so framed could result in
injunctive relief forcing the municipality to institute policies that would ad-
dress tunnel vision in criminal proceedings and potentially reduce the fre-
quency of wrongful convictions.
CONCLUSION
State and local governments have not done enough to stop wrongful
convictions.  Therefore, it is high time federal courts intervene in the manner
intended by § 1983.  Unfortunately, § 1983 “malicious prosecution” claims
are not having the reform effect they might if the “malice” requirement
applied by many courts were replaced by an “objective reasonableness”
standard appropriate for such Fourth Amendment claims.  A shift to an “un-
reasonable prosecution” framework would enable courts to scrutinize the
not to commit perjury, and permitting plaintiffs to conduct discovery to determine whether
there was a pattern of perjury by police officers that notified city policymakers of the need for
training and supervision); Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1479 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
“a reasonable jury could conclude that the likelihood of unjustified incarceration was so obvi-
ous that defendant’s” failure to take action evidenced deliberate indifference); Reynolds v.
Borough of Avalon, 799 F. Supp. 442, 447 (D.N.J. 1992) (holding that “a reasonable jury
could find that the risk of sexual harassment in the workplace is so obvious that an employer’s
failure to take action to prevent or stop it from occurring — even in the absence of actual
knowledge of its occurrence — constitutes deliberate indifference”).
283 Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 842 (10th Cir. 1997).
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actions of law enforcement personnel and local governments through a cog-
nitive science lens, and, hopefully, increase the likelihood that injured plain-
tiffs are compensated and that states implement education and training
programs to mitigate the cognitive biases most frequently driving wrongful
convictions.  This change to the legal standard would give true criminal jus-
tice reform a fighting chance.
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